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I. Introduction  
 In May of 2008, the California Supreme Court held that same sex partners 
had a constitutional right to marry.1  In November of 2008, the voters of 
                                                 
*  Professor, Chicago-Kent College of Law.  Many thanks to Anne Dailey, Stephen 
Heyman, Harold Krent, Michelle Oberman, Mark Rosen and Kimberley Yuracko for very 
helpful comments on earlier drafts.  Thanks also to Marcia Lehr for exemplary research 
assistance.   
1 In Re Marriage Cases, 193 P2d 384, 399  (Ca. 2008) (“[The] core substantive rights [of 
marriage] include the opportunity of an individual to establish . . . an officially 
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California voted to amend the constitution to define marriage as between a man 
and a woman.2 In May of 2009, deciding to uphold that voter referendum, the 
California Supreme Court held that same sex couples had a fundamental right to 
“establish an officially recognized family relationship,”3 but not a fundamental 
right to the name marriage itself.  In doing so, the Supreme Court of California 
disaggregated family rights from family status, finding a constitutional right to 
the former even while accepting the voters’ ability to restrict access to the latter.  
 By disaggregating rights from status in this way the California Court was 
following a trend, not only for courts challenged by the same sex marriage 
question, but in family law generally.  In the course of the last 30 years, courts 
and legislatures have often distilled the rights associated with family 
relationships from the traditional names or statuses associated with those 
relationships.  Non-traditional family structures have put increasing pressure on 
the law and private parties to recognize different kinds of family relationships.  In 
response, the law has started to grant alternative family members rights, without 
granting them family status. 
 Consider the well-known case of Michael H. 4  Michael H. was the wealthy, 
worldly young man who bounced between homes in Los Angeles and St. 
Thomas, sometimes with the married woman with whom he was having an affair, 
sometimes with the child born as a result of the affair, but not always or in any 
permanent sense with either of them. Michael H. went to court claiming a 
constitutional right to parental status, just as plaintiffs in the same-sex marriage 
cases have claimed a constitutional right to marital status.  Michael, like many of 
the same-sex marriage plaintiffs, was denied a right to family status, but he did 
not go home empty handed.  Justice Stevens, the swing vote in Michael H. v. 
Gerald D., voted to deny Michael the status of father because whatever the rights 
that his biological connection and relationship to his daughter gave him, they 
were honored by a state statute that allowed him to petition for visitation rights.5   
                                                                                                                         
recognized and protected family . . . [that is] . . . entitled to the same respect and dignity 
as marriage.”)           
2 The voter referendum was generally known as Proposition 8. See 
http://voterguide.sos.ca.gov/past/2008/general/text-proposed-laws/text-of-proposed-
laws.pdf#prop8. 
3 “Proposition 8 reasonably  must be interpreted in a limited fashion, as eliminating only 
the right of same sex couples to equal access to the designation of marriage and as not 
otherwise affecting the constitutional right those couples to establish an officially 
recognized family relationship.”  Strauss v. Horton, 207 P2d 48, 93 Cal Rptr 591, 642 
(2009). 
4 Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 US 110 (1989).  
5  There was much dispute about whether someone like Michael actually could obtain 
visitation rights under the California statute.  The dissent read the existing California 
family law precedent as precluding Michael from being awarded visitation against the 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1441321
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In other words, Michael was denied parental status but not necessarily all the 
rights of parenthood.  Comparably, same sex couples have often won the right to 
the legal incidents of marriage, with Civil Unions and Domestic Partnerships, but 
been denied marital status. 
 Plaintiffs like Michael H. and the same sex couples who argue that they have 
a constitutional right to family status do not always lose.6  Constitutional doctrine 
suggests that there are fundamental rights to both marital and parental status, but 
those rights are limited, cabined by the social meaning of the terms marriage and 
parenthood.    Constitutional doctrine also suggests that the law may be 
compelled to recognize family rights even if they do not grant family status.  
Constitutions may protect rights to be treated as in relationship with another as a 
legal matter.  This latter protection is what Michael and many of the gay and 
lesbian plaintiffs went home with, even if it was not all that they wanted.  
 The trend to disaggregate rights from status does not always have a 
constitutional dimension.  Sometimes judges, legislatures and private actors grant 
rights in the absence of status even if there is no recognized constitutional need to 
do so.  One can remain agnostic on the question of whether state or federal 
constitutions mandate recognition of family relationship rights even in the 
absence of recognizing family relationship status, and still acknowledge that 
many legal actors feel an affirmative duty to honor relationship rights even in the 
absence of family status.7       
                                                                                                                         
mother’s wishes. It is unclear what the 4 dissenters would have ruled if they had believed, 
as Justice Stevens did, that Michael had a reasonable chance of being awarded visitation 
– though not parental status – over the mother’s objection.   
6 See infra Parts IIIA and B.  
7 For the most part, this article collapses the distinctions between the federal and state 
constitutions because they are not relevant to the arguments made here. First, the 
relationship between a state constitution and state family law is essentially the same as 
the relationship between the federal constitution and state family law.  The constitutional 
questions, whether brought under a state or federal document, involve the same kinds of 
constitutional values (see Baker v. Vermont, 744 A2d 864, 870-873 (Vt. 1999) -  
discussing principle of equality under Vermont Common Benefits Clause, noting how it 
is slightly different than federal Equal Protection clause, but also explaining notions of 
equality;  Goodridge v. Dept of Pub. Health, 798 NE2d 941, 956-960 (Mass. 2003) -  
discussing what it means for something to be a civil right, using U.S. supreme Court 
cases;  Lewis v. Harris, 188 NJ 415, 434-436, 908 A.2d 196 (NJ 2006) - discussing 
meaning of the term fundamental liberty interest under the New Jersey due process clause 
using U.S. Supreme Court cases),  the same kinds of analysis (see Baker, Goodridge and 
Lewis, id. - following U.S. Supreme court as guidance on questions of scrutiny), the same 
precedents  ( Id.)  and the same balance of power issues (See in particular, Baker at 887-
889 - discussing importance of deferring to legislature and  Lewis at 458-462 – same.)  
Collapsing the federal/state distinction allows one to proceed with a constitutional 
analysis without having to filter through the different political and social perspectives that 
clearly do distinguish many state supreme courts from the federal one.   
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 Conferring family status bestows on someone the legal rights and obligations 
accompanying that status, but it also honors the expressive value implicit in 
labeling.  Conferring the legal rights and obligations of relationship honors the 
constitutive benefits that flow from being connected to another.  The ability to 
dissagregate legal incidents  from status allows courts and legislatures to 
recognize alternative relationships without necessarily disrupting the social 
meaning of either marriage or parenthood. This article explores the legal 
dimensions of family status and family rights, explains how they are different, 
and analyzes the potential problems with disaggregating them. 
 Critical to the analysis presented here is the recognition that, legally, 
marriage and parenthood are comparable institutions.  To date, few scholars have 
embraced the links between the legal treatment of marriage and parenthood.  
Some scholars have clearly separated them, assuming or stating that they have 
nothing to do with each other. 8  I  argue that isolating the legal treatments, 
particularly the constitutional treatment, of marriage and parenthood from each 
other makes little sense. The vast majority of cases to ever discuss the 
constitutional dimensions of either parenthood or marriage refer to parenthood 
and marriage together, as if the rights are clearly akin to each other.9  
                                                 
8  Anita Bernstein writes that “marriage is different . .. from the other key status category 
of family law – parenthood – in that the relation between parent and child addresses a 
relatively clear and uncontroverted need. Infants cannot survive without resources from 
adults.”  Anita Bernstein, For and Against Marriage, 102 MICH. L. REV. 129, 132 (2003). 
Not one of the cases addressing the right to parental status involved children’s needs 
though.  In all but one case in which a man has claimed a right to parental status, the 
child’s needs were being readily met by both the mother and another man. See Michael 
H. v. Gerald D., supra  1;  Quilloin v. Wolcott, 434 US 246 (1978); Lehr v. Robertson, 
463 US 248 (1983); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979).  In the one case when 
there was not another man to provide for the child, the state was claiming a desire to do 
so.  See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 US 645 (1972).  Cass Sunstein compares state conferral 
of marital status with parental status and assumes (wrongly, I think) that parental status is 
afforded substantially more protection.  “If I am the biological parent of a child, the state 
must have an extremely good reason to sever my relationship with that child.”  Cass 
Sunstein, The Right to Marry, 26 CARD. L . REV 2081.  Presumably, Sunstein was 
referring to the clear and convincing evidence the state must have of abuse and neglect 
before terminating a pre-existing parent’s legal status as parent, but all of the cases just 
cited involved biological fathers and Michael H. was  biological father who also had an 
established relationship with his child.  In all of those cases, the court vested parental 
status in someone else simply because the state thought that would be in the best interest 
of the child.  
9  See e.g.  Meyer v. Nebraska , 262 US 390, 399 ( 1923) “the right of the individual . . . 
to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to 
marry, establish a home and bring up children . . . . “  “[I]t is clear that among the 
decisions that an individual may make without unjustified government interference are 
personal decisions ‘relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships 
and child rearing and education . . . .” Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 US 374, 385 (1978), 
quoting Carey v. Population Services, 431 US 678.  ; “This court has long recognized  . . .  
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Traditionally, marital status determined parental status and the existence of 
parental rights was contingent on the state of one’s marriage.  And, even though 
parental rights are usually cast as negative rights and marital rights are usually 
cast as positive rights both sets of rights are usually protected for the same 
reasons. 
 The article proceeds as follows.   Part II provides a brief description of what 
has been happening to claims for family recognition in the last 30 years.  It 
describes the various ways courts and legislatures have embraced the 
disaggregation of family rights from family status in both the marital and parental 
contexts.  “Domestic partnerships” and “Civil Unions,” “De Facto Parents” and 
“Equitable Parents” are now widely used legal constructs that treat people as 
entitled to the rights (and sometimes liable for the obligations) of legally 
recognized relationship. The proliferation of these new legal categories 
demonstrates how the law has responded to the need to treat people as in 
relationship legally, even as the law has resisted expanding the traditional legal 
statuses of marriage and parenthood. 
 Part III explores the expressive value of marital and parental status.   It 
examines why people may have an interest in the expressive value of marriage 
and parenthood and how and why courts have protected rights to those statuses.  
The expressive value of marriage is more obvious, both in practice and in the 
cases, than the expressive value of parenthood.  But when analyzed together it 
becomes clear that the ability to claim either marital or parental status has 
expressive value. Because of the immensely meaningful role that family 
relationships play in our individual and collective lives, access to the  family 
status label is very important to people.  Thus, while no one refutes a state’s 
ability to regulate aspects of  marriage and parenthood, the cases strongly suggest 
that a state must be careful in restricting access to those labels.  If an individual’s 
relationship comports well enough with the social understanding of family status, 
he or she is constitutionally entitled to express him or herself through that status. 
 Part IV explores why and how the law protects not just marital and parental 
status but the kinds of relationships that have traditionally been known as  
marriage and parenthood.   Drawing on psychological and philosophical theories 
of relationship, as well as on the legal scholarship of both marriage and 
parenthood, Part IV argues that the legal incidents of marriage and parenthood 
are recognized legally for similar reasons.  They are recognized because being 
entwined with another legally, economically, morally, and socially has such a 
profound effect on who one is, what one wants and how one sees oneself in the 
world.  When the law bestows the rights and obligations that treat one as in 
family relationship with another, the law honors the liberty associated with being 
able to exist with another as a unitary entity. 
                                                                                                                         
freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life . . . “ Cleveland Bd of 
Educ. v  LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-640 (1974).    
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 Part V elaborates on how the constitutional nomenclature surrounding the 
family, in particular the rhetoric of rights involving intimacy, privacy and 
autonomy has fostered confusion in this area.  Part V then explores in some more 
detail why there might be a substantive due process right to the legal incidents of 
family relationship, even in the absence of a right to family status.  
 Part VI will argue that the tendency to disaggregate both marital and parental 
rights from marital and parental status jeopardizes the traditional constitutional 
protection of families. First, to the extent we value the expressive benefits 
associated with assuming family status, those benefits will dissipate as alternative 
family statuses proliferate.  Getting married and being a parent will likely not 
mean the same thing if there are many other kinds of marriage-lite and parent-lite 
arrangements available.   Some may view the availability of more family options 
as a positive development, but if nothing else, the same-sex marriage debate 
shows that many people on both the right and left side of the political spectrum 
want to retain some of the traditional expressive dimension of marriage.  
 Second, courts and legislatures have shown themselves much more willing to 
confer rights than impose obligations on non-traditional family members.  By 
diminishing the legal responsibilities associated with family relationships, courts 
and legislatures diminish the constitutive nature of family relationships.  The less 
formative and defining a relationship is to one’s selfhood, the less it needs any 
legal protection at all.   The need to recognize certain relationships because they 
are so important to the people in them diminishes if relationships come to be seen 
more as voluntary associations that bring with them rights and benefits but no 
responsibilities or obligations. 
 Third, the more legally varied and individuated family-like relationships 
become, the more necessary it will be for courts to insert themselves inside those 
relationships to ascertain individual rights and responsibilities.  The more courts 
insert themselves inside some family relationships, the less likely courts will be 
to honor notions of relationship privacy and autonomy for all family 
relationships.  
 The recent legislative activity embracing same sex marriage10 and many 
public opinion polls showing increasing support for same sex marriage11 suggest 
that the social meaning of marriage is changing.   Enough people in enough 
places will soon believe that marriage is not essentially heterosexual.   Once that 
happens, there will be less need to disaggregate marital rights from marital status 
because same sex couples will have access to marital status.  But before same-sex 
marriage is fully recognized, many states will probably adopt an intermediary 
disaggregative position.  States that cling to traditional definitions of marriage 
                                                 
10 Legislative bodies in Vermont, New Hampshire and Maine have all voted to recognize 
same sex marriages.  See http://www.hrc.org/issues/marriage.asp 
11 See CNN Poll:  Generations disagree on Same Sex Marriage, 
http://www.cnn.com/2009/Us/04/samesex.marriage.poll/  
7                                    Marriage and Parenthood                     [July 20, 2009] 
 
 
 7 
will adopt Civil Unions and Domestic Partnership regimes before they adopt 
marriage.   
 Comparably, courts and legislature will probably continue to grant parental 
rights without granting parental status.12  As with marriage, it may be that the 
pressure to disaggregate is greatest in those political communities that most resist 
changing traditional family definitions.   For instance, courts in states that neither 
recognize any form of same sex union nor allow second parent adoptions, often 
award visitation and custody to non-biological same-sex partners. The 
recognition of either the same sex partnership or the adoption would give the 
partner parental status and thus the automatic right to petition for visitation and 
custody.  Yet several courts have found that the failure of the legislature to confer 
parental status is irrelevant to the question of  whether the non-biological same 
sex partner is entitled to parental rights. 13  These courts thus make a clear 
distinction between family status and family rights.  They award the latter even if 
the legislature has resisted conferring the former.      
 Providing family rights without providing family status in this way may seem 
like a cautious, intermediary step, but in the end this article suggests that it may 
be a move that does more to threaten traditional constitutional protection of 
relationship than honor it.   
II. THE DISAGGREGATION OF FAMILY STATUS FROM FAMILY RIGHTS (AND 
OBLIGATIONS) 
In the past 30 years, it has become abundantly clear that many people, not 
just people in traditional family relationships, very much want the law to treat 
them as in relationship with a significant other.   When asking for legal 
recognition of their relationships, these people do not make contract claims. They 
do not claim an entitlement based on an agreement with another. They make 
situational claims, or claims of entitlement based on the nature of their emotional 
and physical connection to another.14 
                                                 
12  Many academic commentators endorse the idea of expanding rights without 
necessarily expanding status.  See infra note 40.  
13 TB v. LRM, 567 Pa. 222, 232, 786 A 2d 913, 918 (2001) (“The ability to marry the 
biological prent and the ability to adopt the subject child have never been and are not now 
factors in determining whether the third party assumed a parental status and discharged 
parental duties.”);  Mason v. Dwinnell, 660 SE2d 58, 64 (2008) (“[W]e find immaterial 
Dwinnel’s arguments that she and Mason could not marry, and Mason could not adopt 
the child under North Carolina law. . . . “).  
14 By situational, I mean claims based on their lives as lived, not on explicit or implicit 
agreements. See, for instance, the affidavit that UCLA uses to determine entitlement to 
domestic partner benefits. “We are each other’s sole domestic partner and intend to 
remain so indefinitely.  We are in a relationship of mutual support, caring and 
commitment.  We are financially interdependent.”  Cited in Grace Blumberg, The 
8                                    Marriage and Parenthood                     [July 20, 2009] 
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For reasons that have a great deal to do with the United States’ “shadow” or 
“employee” welfare state, many of the initial claims to rights in the partner 
context were made in the private sector.  They were made by employees who 
wanted to give their partners access to the considerable array of welfare benefits 
that, in the United States, are provided by employers to employees and their 
families.15  Notably, these claims were made predominantly by same-sex 
cohabitants, not by opposite sex cohabitants, even though opposite sex 
cohabitants outnumber their gay counterparts by a significant margin.16   
Opposite sex couples may not have pushed as hard for these benefits because 
they knew their claims would ring hallow given their option to marry, or, they 
may not have pushed hard because they actually did not want them.  If they had 
wanted to be treated as a unit by the outside world, they could marry.  It was the 
same sex couples who had no other means of being treated as one.   
The first employer to offer domestic partner benefits to its employees was the 
Village Voice, in 1982.17  In 1992, Lotus Development Corporation  became the 
first publicly traded company to do so.  By 2001, more than 2500 public and 
private employers extended health care benefits to domestic partners. 18  These 
plans cannot be viewed as purely private agreements.  Although the federal 
government has so far refused to confer the same tax advantages on same sex 
couple plans as it does on plans covering married couples,19 government policy-
makers routinely rely on private employer plans when they design health care 
plans.20  The availability of these plans lets people who might not otherwise have 
a reasonable chance of obtaining health insurance coverage do so.  The existence 
of these private plans also influenced various governmental bodies, facilitating 
government recognition of same sex relationship, at least in the employment 
context. 
                                                                                                                         
Regularization of Nonmarital Cohabitation:  Rights and Responsibilities in the American 
Welfare State, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV 1265 1289 (2001)  
15 These benefits include health and disability insurance and access to retirement plans.  
In most other industrialized countries, these type of claims would be made in the public 
sector because it is the state that plays the primary role in providing social insurance 
programs.  
16 See Blumberg, supra note 14 at 1286.  
17 See Human Rights Campaign, What Are Domestic Partner Benefits, at http:// 
www.hrc.org/worknet/dp/dp whatisdp.asp 
18 Id.  
19 2003 TNT 188-24 Health Coverage for Dependent Domestic Partner Not Gross 
Income, Wages.   
20  None of the major health care reform proposals involve dispensing with employer-
based health care completely.   
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At the same time employers were beginning to recognize relationship status 
in the private sector, 21  same-sex marriage advocates were beginning their 
campaign for legally recognized gay marriage.  In the last 18 years, same-sex 
marriage advocates have successfully argued that gays and lesbians are 
constitutionally entitled to marital status in five states.22  Just as important, they 
have forced courts and legislatures to articulate what same sex couples are 
entitled to if they are not entitled to marital status. 
The state of Hawaii, after its Supreme Court ruled that the state Equal 
Rights Amendment forbade the state from prohibiting gays and lesbians from 
marrying each other, brokered a kind of compromise in which the voters 
approved a constitutional amendment defining marriage as “between a man and a 
woman,” but the state legislature passed domestic partner legislation allowing 
two people who could not marry each other the right to register as domestic 
partners. 23   In  Baker v. Vermont24 and Lewis v. Harris,25 the supreme courts of 
Vermont and New Jersey required their state legislatures to pass legislation that 
allowed gay and lesbian couples access to a fully equal set of relationship rights 
and obligations as those available to straight couples.26  New Jersey explicitly 
                                                 
21 Most of these employer based programs confer benefits without requiring significant 
obligation.  To the extent these plans confer pension rights, they often do not require that 
an employee share pension accumulation with their ex-partner in the event of separation..  
See Blumberg, supra note 14 at  1291-92.  Married people, in contrast, are required to 
share pension benefits.  Although there is virtually always fighting about how much 
should be shared and why, every state in the country gives a divorcing spouse a claim to 
pension rights earned by the other spouse during the course of the marriage.   
22   Hawaii found the right to marry as a matter of gender equality.  Baehr v. Lwein, 852 
P2d 44 (Haw 1993), but a subsequent voter initiative restricted marriage to opposite sex 
couples.  Connecticut and Iowa found that gays and lesbians were a suspect class and that 
restrictions on same-sex marriage constituted impermissible discrimination on the basis 
of sexual orientation. Kerrigan v. Commissioner, 951 A. 2d 407 (2008); Varnum v. 
O’Brien, 763 NW2d 862 (Iowa 2009).  The Massachusetts Supreme Court relied little on 
either fundamental rights or equality jurisprudence, holding that in the family law area 
the doctrines were inextricably intertwined and that there was no rational reason to 
restrict marriage to opposite couples anyway.  Goodridge v. Dpt of Pub. Health, 798 
NE2d 941, 953, 961 (Mass. 2003). The California case, In Re Marriage Cases, 193 P2d 
384 (Ca. 2008) was significantly altered by Proposition 8 and the subsequent judicial 
interpretation of what that meant.  See Strauss v. Horton, 93 Cal Rptr 591 (2009).   
23 See Blumberg, supra note 14 at 277-78. 
24 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).  
25 908 A2d 196 (NJ 2006). 
26 Both courts decided this as a matter of equality doctrine, but the equality analysis did 
not extend to the label marriage. 
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found it permissible to deny opposite sex couples access to the marriage label.27  
Vermont implied the same thing, but did not technically reach the question.28  
After Proposition 8 and Strauss v. Horton 29 California’s law now operates as 
New Jersey’s does.30 
The Connecticut state legislature, aware that same sex marriage litigation 
was pending, voted without any court mandate to extend full Civil Union benefits 
to same-sex couples.31  New Hampshire, Maine, and Washington DC also 
adopted extensive domestic partnership protection before their legislatures voted 
to sanction same sex marriage.32  In addition, Oregon, Washington and hundreds 
of municipalities have adopted some form of domestic partner legislation.33 The 
effects of these domestic partnership provisions vary.  They can, but do not 
always, give the full panoply of marital state rights and obligations.  Municipal 
regulations operate more like private employer recognition of same sex 
relationships because they involve few, if any, tax, property and future income 
consequences. 
The American Law Institute’s Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution34 
also recommends treating couples who do not acquire marital status as being 
legally in relationship to each other.  Although some have criticized these 
provisions for denying  couples who do not want to be treated as an entity the 
freedom to be single,35 the ALI has recommended treating non-married people 
                                                 
27 908 A2d at 211 (“[W]we cannot find that a right to same-sex marriage is so deeply 
rooted in the traditions, history and conscience of the people of this state that it ranks as a 
fundamental right.”)  
28 744 A2d  at 886 (“We hold that plaintiffs are entitled to obtain the same benefits and 
protected afforded by Vermont law to married opposite-sex couples. . . . We do not 
purport to infringe upon the prerogatives of the Legislature to craft an appropriate means 
of addressing this constitutional mandate. . . . “)Vermont subsequently became the first 
state to legislate same-sex marriage without being ordered to do so by the state Supreme 
Court.  See www.nytimes.com/2009/04/08/us/08vermont.html.   
29 93 Cal Rptr 591, see supra note 2. 
30 Though in California, same-sex couples have both a fundamental right and an equality 
right to all the legal incidents of marriage.  See Strauss v. Horton, 93 Cal Rptr at 624, 
627.  
31 The Connecticut Supreme Court subsequently required the state to recognize marriage, 
on the theory that separate could not be equal.  See Kerrigan, supra note 22.  
32 See http://lambdalegal.org/nationwide-status-same-sex-relationships.html. 
33 See id. for summary of state legislation giving same sex couples some form of 
relationship status, but not marriage.  
34 See American Law Institute, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION:  
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (2002) [herinafter ALI PRINCIPLES] , Chapter 6.   
35 See, in particular, Elizabeth Scott, Domestic Partnerships, Implied Contracts and Law 
Reform,  in RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY:  CRITIQUES ON THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE’S 
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION 331 (Wilson ed.) (2006) [herinafter 
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who have not contracted into or around the background rules of marriage, as if 
they were married.  This treatment includes, importantly, holding both parties 
economically accountable to the other in the event of dissolution.  Both property 
and compensatory payments (traditionally known as maintenance or alimony) are 
to be awarded to domestic partners in accordance with the same principles as 
those used in the marriage context.36  In other words, the law is supposed to treat 
people as married even though they do not have the legal label of marriage. 
In the parental arena, there has been a comparable and mostly concurrent 
trend.  In part because adults tend to drift into and out of relationships more than 
they used to,  in part because DNA testing allows us to determine genetic 
parentage with certainty, in part because artificial insemination has become so 
much more readily available, and in part because gay and lesbian parenting has 
become less taboo, 37 non-traditional parents now routinely petition courts for 
parental rights.  And sometimes, legal parents petition courts in order to hold 
non-traditional parents liable for parental obligations.38  Grandparents, step-
parents and other third parties often enjoy statutorily protected rights to 
visitation,39 and numerous scholars have called for a more expansive, less 
exclusive view of parenthood, one that leaves room for the law to recognize 
many different kinds of adult relationships in a child’s life.40  
                                                                                                                         
RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY] .  See also ,  Margaret Brinig, Domestic Partnership and 
Default Rules, Id. At 269; Marsha Garrison, Marriage Matters: What’s Wrong with the 
ALI’s Domestic Partnership Proposal  Id. At 305.   
36 See ALI PRINCNIPLES, supra note 34 at §§ 6.05, 6.06 
37 For more on how all of these factors are forcing the law to come to terms with what it 
thinks the defining features of parenthood should be, see Katharine K. Baker, 
Bionormativity and the Construction of Parenthood,  42 Ga L Rev 649 (2008).   
38 See Katharine K. Baker, Bargaining or Biolog: The History and Future of Paternlity 
Law and Parental Status, 14 Cornell J. of L. and Public Policy 1, 15-16 (2004).    
39 See e.g. Margaret Mahoney, Step-parents as Third Parties In Relation to Their Step-
Children, 40 FAM. L. Q 81, n. 82  (2006)  (“The visitation status in a number of states 
include stepparents under an umbrella provision that authorizes visitation petitions by 
‘any person.’ . . . In other jurisdictions, the unrestricted category of stepparents is 
specifically included in the visitation statute. “) 21 J. FAMILY ISSUES 246, 247-248  
(2000) (“Grandparent visitation rights law were enacted in all 50 states over a period of 
23 years.”)   These rights must be treated as somewhat secondary to parental rights, but 
they are still cognizable, see Troxel v. Granville, 530 US 57 (2000).  A host of 
grandparent visitation statues have been upheld even after Troxel.  
40 Katharine T Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: The Need for 
Legal Laternative When the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70 Va L Rev 879 
(1984) (suggesting that legal notions of parenthood should be expanded for families that 
don’t live as a traditional nuclear family);  Naomi Cahn, Reframing Child Custody 
Decisionmaking, 58 OHIO ST. L. J 1 91997) (advocating the designation of many adults as 
“parents”);  Barbar Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg:  A Child-Centered Perspective on 
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In response to these trends, many courts have developed “de facto parent” 
doctrines, “equitable parent” doctrines, and “parenthood by estoppel” doctrines.41    
Usually these doctrines involve giving non-traditional parents visitation rights.  
Less often, they involve holding non-traditional parents liable for child-support.  
As in the cohabitation area, the American Law Institute has called for legal 
recognition of these alternative parenting relationships.  Advocating the adoption 
of both a “de facto parent” class and a “parenthood by estoppel” doctrine, the 
ALI supports an expansion of parental rights and, far more rarely, parental 
responsibility.42  In short there has been widespread creation of legally 
cognizable parental relationships, even in people who do not have the legal label 
of parent.43 
This article’s analysis of the dual dimensions of the legal treatment of 
relationship helps explain the widespread tendency to disaggregate relationship 
rights from relationship status.  As family structures proliferate, something 
compels the law to recognize them even as something else restricts the law’s 
embrace of them.  As Part III will argue, what keeps courts and legislatures from 
embracing many different kinds of marriage and multiple forms of parenthood is 
an allegiance to the social meaning of the institutions of marriage and 
parenthood.  That social meaning is not fixed, but neither is it infinitely 
capacious.  People only have a right to those institutions and to the expressive 
potential implicit in their labels if those individuals’ situations comport to the 
social understanding of those terms. 
The law has been far more willing to legitimate claims for family rights 
though.  It has been willing to treat two people as one and force others to do the 
same.44  It has been willing to award visitation rights to people who never 
enjoyed the legal status of parent and never attempted to get it.45  Although 
                                                                                                                         
Parent’s Rights, 14 CARD. L REV 1747 (1993)(advocating a more care-based approach to 
parental rights).  
41 See Baker, Bionormativity, supra note 37.  
42 For more on the assymetrical way in which the ALI treats parental rights and 
responsibilities, see Katharine K. Baker, Assymetric Parenthood, in RECONCEIVING THE 
FAMILY at 121-128 supra note 35.  
43 The ALI Principles of Family Dissolution leave the determination of legal parenthood 
to someone else.  One comment explains that determinations of legal paternity are “a 
matter outside the scope of these Principles.” § 3.03 cmt. D, at 418. It is not clear why the 
ALI draftsr felt comfortable passing over the question of legal parentage (e.g. parental 
status) while embracing the task of determining parental-like rights and obligations, see 
Baker, Assymetirc Parenthood, supra  note 42 at 126-127.    
44 This is what many aspects of domestic partnerships and civil unions do. 
45 See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra  note 34, Chapter 2 (describing de facto parent doctrine); 
ENO v. LMM, 711 NE2d 886 (Mass. 1999) (awarding visitation rights to a non-
biologically related lesbian co-parent); JAL v. EPH, 682 A2d 1314 (Pa. Super. 1996)  
(same).  
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initially resistant,46 many legal actors now feel compelled to honor most family 
relationships as lived, even if they do not feel compelled to change the definition 
of marriage and parenthood as legally defined.  Parts III and IV explore why.   
III:  EXPRESSIVE LABELS 
A.  Marriage 
 As virtually every court47 and commentary48 to have engaged the question of 
same sex marriage has noted, there are numerous material and nonmaterial legal 
incidents of marriage.  The legal incidents of marriage, for the most part,  define 
the variety of ways in which the law requires the government and private actors 
to treat married people as a unit.   But most people probably do not get married to 
secure the legal incidents of marriage. They get married because the act of 
getting married and being married conveys widely understood messages of unity 
and commitment. 49   
 Getting married – as opposed to just living together or making a promise to 
one’s partner -  signifies a greater commitment in part because it is public ( it is 
harder to break a promise that everyone knows one has made), in part because 
state rules make it more onerous to break, but also because by marrying, people 
attach themselves to an institution that that is bigger than themselves.  
Individuals may try to define the terms of their own marriage for each other,50 but 
                                                 
46  The early gay marriage cases did not fair well. See Baker v. Nelson, 191 NW2d 185 
(Minn. 1971), 409 US 810 (1972)  (denying gay male couple the right to marry);  Alison 
D. v. Virginia M, 572 NE2d 27 (NY 1991)  (denying non-biologically related lesbian co-
parent any visitation or custody rights).   Several more state high courts have also resisted 
more recent claims to gay marriage, see e.g. Conaway v. Deane, 932 A2d 571 (Md. 2007) 
(denying any right to same sex marriage); Hernandez v. Robles, 855 NE2d 1 (NY 2006).     
47 See e.g., Goodridge v. Dept of Pub. Health, 798 NE2d 941, 955-56 (Mass. 2003); 
Lewis v. Harris, 908 A2d 196, 215 92006); Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864, 870 (1999); 
Hernandez v. Robles 855 N.E.2d 1, 2 (2006) 
48 See Bernstein, supra note 8; Sunstein, supra note 8 at 1090; David Chambers, What If?  
The Legal  Consequences of Marriage and the Legal Needs of Lesbian and Gay Male 
Couples, 95 MICH. L. Rev. 447 (1996)  
49 There is little question that, on average, those who commit to each other through 
marriage end up making a more binding commitment than those who commit to each 
other without getting married. See Marsha Garrison, Marriage Matters, supra note 35 at 
308 (citing studies showing that only 105 of cohabitants who do not marry are together 
after 5 years, whereas 80% of first marriages survive past 5 years and 66% of first 
marriages survive past 1-0 years.)  
50 Many individuals may also not feel this freedom.  Social norms exert powerful forces 
on the parties to a marriage and are likely to make them feel more committed and less 
free to define the relationship as they want. See Elizabeth Scott, Social Norms and the 
Legal Regulations of Marriage, 86 VA. L. REV. 1901 (2000).    
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if they associate themselves with the institution of marriage, their relationship 
will necessarily be interpreted by outsiders in certain ways.   
 For instance, it is very likely that others will view a marriage as a 
relationship involving shared values, shared resources and significant emotional 
support.51  Any given marriage may not involve these things and the state is 
limited in the extent to which it can enforce the sharing of these things, but 
sharing these things is what most people think married people do because that is 
what marriage means.  Thus getting married is a way of sending a message about 
one’s relationship.  One sends that message to the world, to one’s partner and 
quite probably to oneself.   The ability to send that message and attach oneself to 
the institution of marriage appears to be enormously important to people.  Most 
people do it and even more people want to do it.52  Perhaps for this reason, the 
Supreme Court has, at times, protected individuals’ right to marital status. 53 
 The United States Supreme Court has decided three different right to marry 
cases.  Richard Loving, a white man, and Mildred Loving, an African-American 
woman, married in the District of Columbia but wanted to reside and stay 
married in the state of Virginia.54  Virginia prohibited interracial marriage. Roger 
Redhail wanted to marry his current girlfriend even though he was in arrears on a 
                                                 
51 People assume marriages involve this kind of sharing because of the social norms 
associated with marriage.  See id.    
52 See infra notes 173-175 (more than 83% of women ages 35-44 have married and even 
more women express a desire to get married.)  Because getting married also involves 
getting a marriage license, marriage involves governmental speech as well.  In granting 
the license, the state says “this relationship is worthy of the rights and obligations that we 
confer on married people” Gays and lesbians fighting for the right to marry are claiming 
a right to have the government legitimate their relationship too, but the arguments they 
have recently used as to why the government should do so have been rooted in the 
personal expressive value that marriage provides to the people who marry.  See infra text 
accompanying notes  70-77.  
53  See infra, next paragraph. Two of the three state courts that have successfully awarded 
same-sex couples the label marriage have done so as a matter of equality, not 
fundamental rights theory.  See Varnum v. O’Brien, 763 NW2d 862 (Iowa, 2009) and 
Kerrigan v. Commisioner, 951 A.2d 707 (Ct. 2008).  That is, same sex couples have been 
more successful in claiming a right to the marriage label because straight couples have it 
then in claiming an independent right to the label itself. California originally said there 
was a fundamental right to the label marriage, but let that finding be overturned by 
Proposition 8.  See supra text accompanying note 2 and infra text accompanying notes 
76-77.  The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, in the first Supreme Court decision 
to mandate same-sex marriage, said that equal protection and fundamental rights analysis 
were inextricably intertwined and therefore it was not important to separate them, but 
Massachusetts also found that the restrictions on same-sex marriage could not pass 
rational basis review.  Thus, the particular constitutional doctrine was not that important.  
See Goodridge v. Dpt of Pub Health, 798 NE2d 941, 961 (Mass. 2003). 
54 Loving v. Virginia, 388 US 1 (1967) 
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child support obligation owed to a child he had sired, while a teenager, several 
years before. 55   Wisconsin law denied the right to marry to people who could 
not prove that their pre-existing children were “not then and not likely thereafter 
to become public charges.”56  Leonard Safely was in jail in Missouri and wanted 
to get married. Prison regulations prevented him from doing so.57   
 The first case, Loving v. Virginia is notorious for being simultaneously 
straightforward and obtuse.   As a matter of equal protection doctrine, the ban on 
interracial marriage was readily struck down by the Supreme Court because the 
ban on interracial marriage was a transparent state endorsement of white 
supremacy.58  But in the final three (very short) paragraphs of Loving,  the Court 
declared that marriage was protected by the Due Process Clause because it was 
one of the “‘basic civil rights of man’ fundamental to our very existence and 
survival.” 59 The Court then quickly put in a qualification: “to deny this 
fundamental freedom [to marry] on so unsupportable a basis as the racial 
classification . . . is surely to deprive . . . due process of law.”60   The first part of 
this short section at the end of the Loving opinion thus seems to suggest that the 
Constitution protects a right to marry because marriage is so fundamental to 
existence. The subsequent line qualifies that right by suggesting that denial of the 
right to marry may be permissible in some instances, but not “on so 
unsupportable a basis” as race.   
 Eleven years after Loving, Roger Redhail applied for a marriage license and 
was denied because he owed child support.  As support for the idea that marriage 
is a fundamental right, the majority opinion cited almost every constitutional case 
having anything to do with parenting,61 procreation,62 marriage,63 or other family 
                                                 
55 Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 US 374 (1978). 
56  434 US 374,  375 (1978) 
57 Turner v. Safely, 482 US 78 (1987). 
58  “The fact that Virginia prohibits only interracial marriages including white persons 
demonstrates [the law to be] designed to maintain White Supremacy.”  Loving, 388 US at 
11.  
59  Id. at 12, quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 US 538 (1942) (the invocation of Skinner, 
a case involving sterilization and thus a restriction on parenthood, is another example of 
the court referring to marriage and parenthood together, as if the rights are akin to each 
other, see supra text accompanying note 9 )  
60 Loving 388 US at 12.  
61 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 US 390 (1923) (right of parents to hire someone else to teach 
children a language other than English); Pierce v. Socy of Sisters, 268 US 510 (1925) 
(right of parents to send children to private school); Prince v. Mass., 321 US 158 (1943) 
(state’s parens patraie interest in children must be balanced against parents’ rights to raise 
children as they believe appropriate)  are all cited, 434 US at 385. 
62 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 404 US 438 (right of non-married people to contraception), Roe v. 
Wade, 410 US 113 (right to abortion); Carey v. Population Services, 431 US 678 (same) 
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relationships.64  For reasons the Court did not make entirely clear, the totality of 
all of those cases suggested that there must be a fundamental right to marry.    
 When Leonard Safely wanted to get married, in jail, the Court finally felt 
compelled to explain in a little more detail why the Constitution protected a right 
to marry.  Relying only on Zablocki for the idea that there is a fundamental right 
to marry, the Court tried to explain why.  Marriage is “an expression of 
emotional support and public commitment.”65 It “may be an exercise of religious 
faith as well as an expression of personal dedication.”66  It “is often a 
precondition to the receipt of governmental benefits . . . property rights  . . . and 
other, less tangible benefits (e.g. the legitimation of children born out of 
wedlock”).67  All of those reasons augered in favor of letting Leonard Safely 
marry. 
 The expressive qualities of marriage, noted explicitly first by the Turner 
court, have been particularly important to the constitutional treatment of same 
sex marriage recently.   In Baker v. State,68  the Vermont Supreme Court 
acknowledged the symbolic importance of marriage, though it curiously 
determined that marriage’s symbolism was not at issue, writing that it was the 
“plaintiffs claim to the secular benefits and protections of . . . [marriage] . . . that . 
. . characterize[d] this case.”69  In other words, the Court determined that there 
                                                                                                                         
Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 US 632 (right to not be fired for being 
pregnant)  
63  Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 US 538 (1942) (prohibiting mandatory sterilization) 
Griswald v. Connecticut, 381 US 479 (1965)  (finding that married couples have a right 
to privacy that includes the right to contraceptives) and Loving are all cited, 434 US at 
385.  
64  Smith v. OFFFER (rights of foster parents), 431 US 816 (1977); Moore v. City of East 
Cleveland, 431 US 494 (1977)  (rights of non-nuclear family to live together). 
65Turner v. Safley, 482 US 78, 95 (1987) (emphasis added) 
66 Id. At 96 (emphasis added) 
67  Id..  This last item explicitly invokes the legal incidents of marriage, not marriage’s 
expressive value, though the last “benefit,” the legitimation of children, is a particularly 
weak argument because for the most part, by this time, states not allowed to treat 
illegitimate children differently than legitimate children,  see generally IRA ELLMAN, 
PAUL KURTZ, ELIZABETH SCOTT, LOIS WITHORN AND BRIAN BIX, FAMILY LAW:  CASES, 
TEXT, PROBLEMS (4th ed.) 1035-1038 92004) (describing the evolution of the 
constitutional doctrine on illegitimate children),  and legitimation could be accomplished 
by simply signing a birth certificate or acknowledging paternity.  See Uniform Parentage 
Act, discussed infra note 91.   
68 Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).  
69  Id. At 889.  It is not at all clear why the court decided that the plaintiffs were not 
asking for the symbolic aspects of marriage itself. The dissent certainly thought that the 
plaintiffs were asking for the symbolic aspects of marriage.    
17                                    Marriage and Parenthood                     [July 20, 2009] 
 
 
 17 
was a an expressive component of marriage that was distinct from the panoply of 
rights and benefits marriage affords. 
 In Goodridge v. Dept. of Public Health70 the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts highlighted the expressive aspects of marriage in granting the 
right to same sex marriage.  The first line of the opinion reads simply: “Marriage 
is a vital social institution.”71  It noted that marriage is a function of 
“community”72 and that it is “at once a deeply personal commitment to another 
human being and a highly public celebration . . . . “73  No doubt, the 
Massachusetts court emphasized the expressive value in order to explain why it 
was going further and requiring marriage in a way that the Supreme Court of 
Vermont did not in Baker. 
 The New Jersey plaintiffs in Lewis v. Harris74  adopted the Massachusetts 
Court’s rhetoric, arguing that marriage is the “ultimate expression of love, 
commitment and honor you can give to another human being.’  “[O]thers know 
immediately that you have taken steps to create something special.”75  The New 
Jersey Supreme Court did not deny the expressive value of marriage, but found 
that it was not protected for gays and lesbians under either the substantive due 
process or equal protection clauses of the New Jersey Constitution.   
 In In re Marriage Cases, California became the first and only state court to 
find that same sex couples had a fundamental right to the marriage label. Same 
sex coules already had the full panoply of Domestic Partnership rights, but the 
California Supreme Court held that gays and lesbians had a fundamental right to 
marry because the label marriage commanded the respect and dignity of others.76  
It was because of the positive way that others view people with marital status that 
the California court said marriage was a fundamental right.77 
                                                 
70 798 NE2d 941 (Mass. 2003)  
71 Id. At 948 (emphasis supplied).   
72 Id. (marriage is “one of our community’s most rewarding and cherished institutions”) 
73  Id. At 954 (emphasis supplied)  
74 908 A.2d 196 (NJ 2006).  
75 Lewis v. Harris,  908 A.2d 196, 225-26 (Poritz, C.J., concurring and dissenting) 
(quoting plaintiffs’ briefs)(emphasis added). 
76 “[O]ne of the core elements of this fundamental right [to marry] is the right of same sex 
couples to have their official family relationships accorded the same dignity, respect and 
stature as that accorded to all other officially recognized family relationships.”  In Re 
Marriage Cases, 193 P2d at 434.  
77 “The current statuses – by drawing a distinction between the name assigned to the 
family relationship available to same sex couples and by reserving the historic and highly 
respected designation of marriage exclusively to same sex couples . . . pose serious risk 
of denying the official family relationships of same sex couples the equal respect and 
dignity that is a core element of the constitutional right to marry.”  Id. At 435.   After 
Proposition 8, the California Court decided the same sex couples still had a fundamental 
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 The idea that marriage has an important expressive dimension is also evident 
from the way scholars discuss it.  As David Chambers argued in his support of 
gay marriage, “marriage is the single most significant communal ceremony of 
belonging.” 78 Carol Sanger notes that civil marriage “is a convention that signals 
an acceptance of certain obligations.  It does so publicly (often ceremoniously) 
and as a matter of law.”79 Cass Sunstein has argued that the right to marry counts 
as fundamental only “because of the expressive benefits that come from official, 
state-licensed marriage.”80 
 That marriage must serve some kind of expressive function becomes clear 
once one looks at the history of marriage.  Every state and every religious 
tradition, at least for the last 600 years, has required that a witness be present at 
the marriage ceremony.81   Marriage, unlike other promises that we might ask the 
law to regulate, cannot be made “just” between two people.  Others must be 
there.  One needs to find a Justice of the Peace or a judge or minister even if one 
does not want a party with friends or family. 
 Common law marriage, the equitable legal doctrine through which courts 
conferred marital status on people who cohabited and acted as if they were 
married, has  always required the parties to hold themselves out to the public as 
                                                                                                                         
right to the legal incidents of marriage, though not a fundamental right to the label itself.  
See supra text accompanying note 2.  In essence, the court conceded what this article 
argues, which is that the right to a family status label is cabined by social norms 
regarding the social meaning of that status.  Proposition 8 clarified the social norms.  
As mentioned, Iowa and Connecticut rooted the right to marry in equality 
principles, see Varnum, 763 NW2d 862, and Kerrigan, 951 A2d, 407, which allowed the 
court to speak less about the nature of marriage itself and more about discrimination.  
Massachusetts did not reach the question of whether there was a fundamental right to 
same sex marriage. See supra notes 19, 50    
78 Chambers, supra note 48 at 450.   
79 Carol Sanger, A Case for Civil Marriage, 27 CARD. L. REV. 1311,1317 (2006). 
80  Sunstein, supra at 2096 
81  See GEORGE P. MONGER, MARRIAGE CUSTOMS OF THE WORLD:  FROM HENNA TO 
HONEYMOONS,(“The most important thing (about a wedding ceremony) . . . is that it be 
public;” ) Edith Turner & Pamela Frese, Marriage, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RELIGION, Vol. 
8 2d 2d. (“Two elements are used to mark a marriage whether there is a ceremony or not:  
the sharing of food between the bride and groom . . . and the necessity of a public 
statement on the requirement of witnesses.” )  In Catholic history, the requirement that a 
priest be present at the ceremony started out as a custom, but later became a requirement.  
Glendon, supra note at 24.  The Jewish tradition asks at least 2 or 3  witnesses to sign the 
Ketubah as evidence of their witnessing the promise.  Muslim ceremonies also require 
witnesses. See Monger, supra this note at 170.  Every state in this country requires 
someone, either an agent of the state or of a religious faith or some third party specially 
deputized for the task to be present at the marriage ceremony.  It simply is not marriage if 
there is not someone else there.  
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married.82 Historian Nancy Cott entitled her comprehensive review of American 
marriage, “Public Vows.”83  If marriage were only about privacy, as the Supreme 
Court’s rhetoric sometimes suggests,84 than none of these public requirements 
would make any sense.  The ubiquitous public requirements of marriage suggest 
that at some fundamental level marriage is about making a statement to others. 
 Expressive potential is necessarily limited by social meaning, however.  
Getting married makes a statement because of what people understand marriage 
to mean.  Commitment is a part of that meaning, but it is not necessarily the only 
part of that meaning.  The totality of the social meaning of marriage is 
indubitably informed by historical understanding.  Marriage simply would not 
mean the same thing if it were created yesterday.   
 Thus, to the extent that the constitution protects people’s ability to secure 
marital status because marriage serves as a form of expression, that protection 
must be limited by social meaning.   What “others know immediately”85 about 
the statement of marriage depends on what others think marriage is, and that 
social understanding is not fixed.  Marriage means something different today 
than it did 100 years ago.  To some, that contemporary meaning is clearly 
capacious enough to include gay men and lesbians.86  To others, it is not.87  The 
fundamental rights language in Loving suggests that interracial marriage, even if 
nowhere near normative, was not inconsistent enough with the social meaning of 
marriage to permit states to ban it.”88   The plaintiffs in Zablocki and Turner were 
entitled to marital status because what they were claiming was a right to express 
themselves through a very traditional form of marriage.  As Sunstein notes, “the 
expressive benefits of marriage are contingent on a particular constellation of 
social norms; there is nothing inevitable about them.”    
                                                 
82 “[O]ne element essential to the proof of . . . [common law marriage] . . is a general and 
substantial holding out or open declaration to the public . . . There can be no secret 
common law marriage.”  In re Estate of Dallman, 228 NW2d 187, 190 (Iowa 1975)..  
83 See NANCY COTT,  PUBLIC VOWS (2000).  
84 In Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 US 479 (1965) the Supreme Court held that married 
couples enjoy a privacy right that entitles them to use contraception.    In Part IV, I 
suggest that marital privacy includes a right to be treated as an autonomous marital entity, 
but in this Part I argue that the Constitution also protects a right to marriage as 
expression. This right cannot be considered a privacy right because it is inherently public.   
85 See supra note 75.  
86 See supra note 11 (poll showing how many Americans believe that same sex couples 
should be allowed to marry).  See also  Goodridge, supra note 22  (no rational reason to 
restrict marriage to opposite sex couples) 
87 Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196 (NJ 2006) (accepting the state’s right to define the 
social meaning of marriage in heterosexual terms).  As suggested, the voters defined the 
social meaning of marriage in California when they passed Proposition 8. See supra note 
77 
88 Sunstein supra note 8 at 2098.  
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B.  Parenthood    
 The Supreme Court cases addressing parental status suggest that the rights of  
people to secure parental status are also “contingent on a particular constellation 
of social norms.”89  For the most part, parentage, like marriage, is a question of 
state law.  State parentage acts determine who enjoys presumptions of 
parenthood (a woman giving birth to a child, for instance, or a man married to 
that woman or a man listed on a birth certificate), and what procedures, if any, 
exist  for rebutting those presumptions.90  State law also determines when a 
parent can be displaced as a parent, by whom, and when.91   For years, state 
statutes have assigned paternal status in cases of artificial insemination92 and 
                                                 
89 Id. 
90 Virtually all states have parentage acts establishing not only presumptions of 
parenthood, but statutes of limitations for contesting those presumptions.  Today, most 
states allow most presumptions of parenthood to be rebutted with DNA evidence, but the 
ability to do so can be limited temporally both by statutes of limitations, see e.g.,  Cal. 
Fam Code §§ 7540-7541   (giving those who wish to challenge a presumption of 
paternity two years from the discovery of relevant facts) and estoppel principles.  See 
Markov v. Markov, 758 A.2d 75, 81 (Md. 2000) (denying husband right to challenge 
paternity because he accepted role as father despite having had a vasectomy before the 
children were born); In Re Cheryl, 746 NE2d 488, 497 (Mass. 2001) (holding non-
biological father responsible for child support because he continued to fill the role of 
father even after acquiring reason to believe he as not the father)   
91 See Uniform Parentage Act  (2002).  As a preliminary indication of how complicated 
parentage questions can become, the first Comment to the Act notes “[f]our separate 
definitions of “father” are provided by the Act to account for the permutations of a man 
who may be so classified.”  The Uniform Act generally requires that claims to establish 
paternity be brought within two years of the child’s birth, §607, or two years of an 
acknowledgement of paternity, §609. Actions to disestablish paternity of a presumed 
father may be brought at any time, but only if the presumed father never had sex with the 
mother at the probable time of conception and never held himself out as father.  §607.  
The cases make clear that courts’ willingness to change a presumed father’s status is very 
fact specific.  A genetic father can sometimes displace a presumed father but not always.  
A presumed father can sometimes relinquish his status  if he can find the biological father 
of if the biological father willingly comes forward.  On the other hand, if two men are 
competing for the status of father (or competing not to be the father) courts often 
disregard biology altogether and use a Best Interest of the Child standard to determine 
paternity.  See Baker, Bargaining or Biology, supra note 38 at 12-14. 
92 See e.g. Uniform Parentage Act, supra note 91, §§704, 705.  Often, these statutes 
distinction between formal inseminations performed by a licensed phsycian and those 
performed informally.  The husband of the impregnated woman is considered the father if 
the insemination was done by a licenses physician, but not necessarily if it was not.  See 
e.g. CALIF. FAM. CODE §7613 (2003).  Although there may be reasons for making this 
distinction (a licensed physician lobby, for one) , it is not clear that those reasons have 
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state statutes now routinely designate who should be considered the mother in 
cases of surrogacy.93 
 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has recognized some constitutional right to 
be declared a parent.  In 1972, Peter Stanley, who had lived with his three 
biological children and their mother for most of the children’s lives, challenged 
an Illinois dependency statute that presumed the children to be parentless if their 
unwed mother was dead.94    The Court held that the Constitution guaranteed a 
man who had “sired and raised”95 his children, an opportunity to be heard before 
the state could declare his children wards of the state.  Thus, the Constitution 
seemed to protect Stanley’s right to the legal status of father.  
 Several years later, Leon Quilloin tried to block the adoption of the 11 year 
old child he had sired (though never lived with) using a comparable claim:  The 
Constitution guaranteed him rights as a father, including the right to keep 
someone else from becoming the father, because Quilloin had sired the child, 
periodically paid child support and seen the child on occasion.96  The Supreme 
Court readily dismissed Quilloin’s claim, finding that whatever constitutional 
interest Quilloin had in being a father was adequately protected at a Best Interest 
of the Child hearing in which a judge found that the child’s best interest would be 
served by vesting fatherhood in someone else.  Quilloin was stripped of his status 
as father. 
 A potential father named Robert Lehr tried again.  He argued that the mother 
of his biological two-year old girl had prevented him from developing any kind 
of relationship with the girl and that fact, coupled with his biological connection 
and his willingness to assume parental responsibility, should guarantee him the 
right to block the child’s adoption by another man.97  The Court said no, finding 
that Lehr’s failure to develop a relationship, even if it was due to the mother’s 
intransigence, minimized any constitutional claim he might have.  The Court 
explained:  “Parental rights do not spring full-blown from the biological 
connection between parent and child. They require relationships more 
enduring.”98  The state court was free to vest fatherhood in someone else.  
                                                                                                                         
much to do with protecting the interests of those whom we normally think of protecting 
in parentage determinations.   
93 See Institute for Law Science and Technology,  The Laws of Reproductive Technology, 
http/www.kentlaw.edu/islt/reprotech.html. 
94  Stanley v. Illinois, 405 US 645 (1972).  
95 Id, 405 US at 651.  
96 Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 US 246 (1978)  
97 Lehr v. Robertson, 463 US 248 (1983).  
98  Id. At 260 quoting Caban v. Mohammed, 441 US 380, 397 (1979) (Stewart, J. 
dissenting).  Caban involved a successful claim for paternal status, though the court 
decided the case as a matter of sex discrimination.  Mr. Caban was trying to block the 
adoption of his children by another man, but what distinguished him from Quilloin was 
22                                    Marriage and Parenthood                     [July 20, 2009] 
 
 
 22 
 In 1989, Michael H. seemed poised to capitalize on the idea that one’s 
constitutional right to status as father turned on the twin requirements of biology 
plus relationship.  Michael H. could establish that he was the biological father of 
a child, Victoria, whom he had lived with from time to time, who called him 
Daddy, and whom he had supported (though others had as well) throughout her 
life.  The Court nontheless rejected Michael’s assertion that he had a 
constitutional right to be declared the father, finding that the state was free to vest 
paternal status in the husband of the biological mother, who had also supported 
Victoria, who was still married to the mother and who was willingly accepting 
paternity.  The California statute at issue embodied a centuries old marital 
presumption of paternity.99  Thus, the Court held that the Constitution did not 
stand in the way of the state conferring parental status on the husband of the 
mother in the same way it always had.100  
 The potential fathers in these parenthood cases probably wanted more than 
just status. They wanted the rights, and maybe even the obligations, that 
accompany parental status.101 It is important to underscore though, that 
particularly at the time these cases were decided, most of these men would have 
gotten minimal visitation time with their children and no right to major parental 
decision-making.102 Judges routinely gave the vast amount of custodial time and 
                                                                                                                         
that he had developed a much more extensive relationship with his children.  Given that 
relationship between father and children, the Supreme Court held that the mother and 
father were similarly situated and that therefore the adoption statute could not treat 
mothers and fathers differently for purposes of securing their consent to adoption.  The 
Lehr court’s subsequent decision strongly suggests that the relationship Mr. Caban 
developed with his children strengthened a constitutionally protected liberty interest in 
his children as well as his equal protection claim.  See Lehr, 463 US at 267-268 
(describing how a father’s actual relationship with his child strengthens his liberty 
interest in paternal status for due process purposes and makes him similarly situated to 
the mother for equal protection purposes).  
99 See Baker, Bargaining or Biology, supra note 38 at 22-25 (analyzing the strength of 
and rationale behind the marital presumption of paternity.)  
100 As noted in the introduction, though,  Justice Stevens, the swing vote, opted against 
giving Michael the right to parental status because the  California statute already 
provided interested third parties (including Michael) a right to petition for the rights 
traditionally associated with parenthood.  In other words, Justice Stevens thought 
Michael was entitled to the rights of parenthood, but not necessarily the status.  491 US 
133-134 (Stevens, J. concurring in the judgment) 
101 Comparably, the plaintiffs in Loving, Zablocki and Turner, see supra text 
accompanying notes 59-64, probably wanted the rights (and maybe the obligations) of 
marriage, not just the status.  
102 The exception to this is Stanley, who, because there was no other parent at the time he 
petitioned, would have enjoyed exclusive parental rights.  
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all major decision-making authority to the custodial parent.103   Most of what 
these men were fighting for was the right to be called a father. That parental 
status entitled one to exclude someone else from having the label father, but little 
else substantively.   Thus, it seems likely that these men cared so much about the 
label father not because of the rights that accompanied it, but because the label 
itself had social value and social meaning. 
 Quilloin, Lehr and Michael H. all suggest limits on the scope of any 
constitutional right to parental status, but they also all take the question seriously. 
That is to say, none of them suggest that Stanley was wrongly decided and none 
of them simply state that the state is free to confer parental status on whomever it 
wants, free from any constitutional constraint on the definition of parenthood. In 
a thoughtful essay, Professor David Meyer has suggested that this limited, though 
probably existent, constitutional protection of parental status may be analogous 
to the constitutional treatment of property.104  The Constitution forbids states 
from taking property105 even as it gives states the extensive discretion to define 
it.106 
 Virtually everyone concedes that states have the ability to modify the 
requirements of adverse possession or adopt a different rule for ground water use 
or tinker with the Rule Against Perpetuities, even though all of those changes 
affect property rights.107  Comparably, few people question the state’s ability to 
honor, or not, surrogacy contracts,  to recognize, or not, second-parent 
                                                 
103 See L. HARRIS, L. TEITELBAUM, J. CARBONE, FAMILY LAW 622-23 (“When the best-
interest standard first took hold, the courts were convinced that custody needed to be 
awarded to one, and only one parent. . .  [T]he participation of the other parent  . . . 
depended on the cooperation of the custodial parent. Certainty in decision-making 
authority was considered essential.”); ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 34 at § 2.08 cmt. a 
(“Traditionally, one parent received custody of a child . . . while the other parent was 
awarded visitation.  Visitation . . . [was] . . . often quite minimal.”)  
104 David D. Meyer, Partners, Care Givers, and the Constitutional Substance of 
Parenthood, in RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY, supra note 43 at 47, 61.  
105 U.S. Const., Amendment V.  
106 “Property interests are not created by the Constitution, ‘they are created and their 
dimensions are divined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent 
source such as state law.’”  Cleveland Bd. Of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 US 532, 538 
(1985) quoting Bd. Of Regents v. Roth, 408 US 564, 577 (1972).   See also Jeremy Paul, 
The Hidden Structure of Takings Law, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 1393, 1402, 1415 (1991)  
(Property rights serve “twin roles – as protector of individual rights against other citizens, 
and as safeguard against excessive government interference.”  “To reconcile American 
Law’s double-edged reliance on property concepts, [we] must successfully distinguish 
between the courts’ role as definers and defenders of property rights.”    
107 See JOSEPH SINGER, PROPERTY LAW: RULES, POLICIES AND PRACTICEs 953-54 (4th ed., 
2006)  
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adoption,108 to determine, for the most part, who is entitled to parental status.   
This does not mean that states have the right to redefine property or parenthood 
beyond social recognition, however.  Just as community expectations, or the 
social meaning of property, help set limits on state’s ability to expand or contract 
property interests,109 “social expectations about the nature of parenthood are 
likely to apply a constitutional brake on state-law efforts to withdraw and 
reassign parent status.”110   
C. Summary 
Social expectations about the nature of marriage and parenthood inform the 
constitutional inquiry with regard to those statuses.  Both marital and parental 
status bring with them rights and obligations, but the statuses have meaning apart 
from those rights and obligations.  People claiming a right to marital or parental 
status are claiming a right to have their relationship understood by others in 
certain commonly understood ways. In granting family status, the state itself 
expresses something (that this is a relationship worthy of state-conferred 
status),111  but it also enables the recipients of the status to proclaim to the world 
their unique relationship to another person.  The analysis of marriage, which is 
perhaps more readily seen as expression, helps elucidate how claims to parental 
status are expressive claims also. 
Expressive claims to status are necessarily cabined by the social  meaning of 
that status, but nontraditional relationships can put pressure on and force courts 
to confront that social meaning.   Loving recognized the legitimacy of a still very 
rare form of marriage and Stanley recognized the legitimacy of unwed 
fatherhood, an even more suspect form of parenthood then than it is now. In each 
case, though, the courts found that the plaintiffs were entitled to call themselves, 
respectively, “married” and “parent,” notwithstanding the wide discretion that 
states have to determine access to and the substantive requirements of marriage 
and parenthood. 
IV. THE CONSTITUTIVE RIGHT TO RELATIONSHIP 
 The legal incidents of marriage and parenthood provide those with rights to 
them some well-known legal advantages.  One gets to visit one’s family member 
                                                 
108 Second parent adoption is the term of art used to describe adoption by two parents of 
the same gender.  It is called “second parent” adoption because, usually, a new parent is 
adopting without any former parent relinquishing parental rights.  See Sharon S. v. 
Superior Ct, 73 P2d 554 n.10 (Cal. 2003).   
109  See Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of Constitutional Property, 86 VA. L. REV 
885, 939 (2000) (Supreme Court’s protection of property deeply informed by “general 
expectations about kinds of interests that are commonly regarded as being property in our 
society.” )  
110  Meyer, Partners, supra note 104 at 62.  
111 See supra note 52.  
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in the hospital.  If needed, one gets to make decisions on behalf of one’s family 
member.  One gets to inherit one’s family member’s property if the family 
member dies intestate.  There are many benefits attendant upon securing the legal 
incidents of marriage and parenthood, but those legal incidents can also be seen 
as thoroughly restrictive.  
 These are the kind of constraints the law imposes on married people.  One 
loses control over approximately 50% of all the earnings one brings to the 
marriage.112  One significantly curtails one’s ability to pursue any non-
remunerative life activity, if in so pursuing, one would be unable to meet future 
support obligations to one’s spouse.113  One loses the right to mortgage any 
property held in tenancy by the entirety, unless one’s spouse agrees.  One loses 
the right to petition a court to enforce many explicit and implicit agreements 
between one’s spouse and oneself, particularly if those agreements pertained to 
duties thought intrinsic to the marriage.114   One also often loses the right to keep 
inherited property if that property was used by both parties to the marriage.115 
One loses the right to testify in court about what one has heard, if one’s spouse 
                                                 
112 In non-community property states, this is not technically true because the property is 
not conceived of as “marital property” until the divorce proceeding, but, at divorce,  
whether in a community property or equitable distribution regime, all earnings earned 
during the course of the marriage are considered property subject to distribution at 
divorce.  See ELLMAN ET AL., supra note 67 at 270-276.  Most jurisdictions divide marital 
property approximately evenly at divorce, id., though sometimes the primary wage earner 
or the spouse with access to more other resources is left with significantly less than 50% 
of the marital property.  See In Re Marriage of Pierson, 653 P.2d 1258 (Or. 1982) (wife 
got less than 50% of the marital property because she came into an inheritance after the 
couple had split.)   
113 All states provide for some spousal maintenance in some instances.  After some 
movement away from substantial spousal maintenance awards in the 1970s and 80s, the 
current trend is toward more substantial maintenance awards.  See  generally, ALI 
PRINCIPLES, supra note 34,   Chapter 5 .  
114 Balfour v. Balfour, L.R. 2 K.B. 571 (C.A. 1919)  (most agreements between husband 
and wife are not meant to be enforceable at law);  Borelli v. Brousseau, 16 Cal. Rptr. 16 
(Cal. App. 1993)  (refusing to enforce a promise to leave more money for spouse because 
for lack of consideration because wife’s promise to care for and support her husband was 
part of her marital duty);  see generally, Jill Elaine Hasday,  Intimacy and Economic 
Exchange, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 492 (2005) (law does not compensate women for work 
performed in marriage).    
115 In some community property states, inherited property is considered marital property. 
See HARRIS, TEITELBAUM supra note 103 at 48.   Many equitable distribution states treat 
any commingled property as marital property. For instance, in  Illinois “ the affirmative 
act of augmenting nonmarital property by commingling it with marital property” creates a 
presumption that the nonmarital (inherited) property is subject to distribution as marital 
property.  See In re Marriage of Smith, 427 NED 2d 1239, 1245-46 (Ill. 1981).    
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said it.116  In some states, one loses the right to sue one’s spouse in tort, 
particularly if the tort was unintentional.117   Given this formidable – and not 
even complete – list of restrictions on one’s autonomy, one might question why 
so many people are clamoring for the right to get married.118   
 The obligations the state imposes on parents are less numerous, but arguably 
stricter and more onerous.  Once one is a legal parent, one simply loses the right 
to walk away from that relationship unless the state and the other parent 
agrees.119  One cannot unilaterally divorce one’s child.  A parent is obligated to 
support his or her child until the child is at least 18 years old.  If one is a 
custodial parent – regardless of how the other parent left – one is responsible for 
physically caring for the child.  Failure to do so is a criminal offense.120  If one is 
a non-custodial parent, one loses the right to allocate one’s resources for one’s 
children as one chooses.  In all states, parental support obligations are set 
                                                 
116 The spousal communications privilege treats as privileged any communication made 
in confidence from one spouse to another as long as the spouses are not accusing the 
other of wrongdoing.  See GEORGE  FISHER, EVIDENCE 839-841 (2002). Most 
jurisdictions extend the privilege to both the communicator and the listener, meaning that 
the either spouse can bar the other from revealing marital confidences.  Id.  
117 For a comprehensive discussion of the state of interspousal tort immunity, see Carl 
Tobias, Interspousal Tort Immunity in America, 23 Ga L Rev 359 (1989).  
118 The idea that the acceptance of pre-nuptial agreements allows most of these 
obligations to be overridden by private contract is much exaggerated.  The Uniform 
Premarital Agreement Act, adopted in the early 1980s suggested that premarital 
agreements should be interpreted like other commercial contracts, but many courts and 
the recent ALI PRINCIPLES  soundly reject that standard, advocating instead some sort of 
review under the traditional unconscionability standard and/or procedural protections.  
See Ellman et al., supra note 67 at 737-766.  Unconscionability is defined with reference 
to what the spouse would be entitled to under the state marital property distribution rules.  
Perhaps most persuasive to this author are comments relayed to me one day over lunch, 
by a practicing family law attorney in Chicago.  He said “I don’t know a family law 
attorney who doesn’t think he can beat any prenup he sees.”  (Comments of Joel Levin,  
June, 2007).  Even if this statement exaggerates the situation somewhat, it suggests that 
there are significant and possibly insurmountable costs and roadblocks to contracting 
around the background marital property distribution rules.   
119  One cannot effectively relinquish parental rights (put the child up for adoption) unless 
the other parent relinquishes also. If one legal parent wants to be a parent and the other 
parent does not, the first parent still has the right to hold the second parent responsible for 
child support.  See Baker, Bionormativity, supra note 37.  Once the child is old enough, 
even if both parents want to relinquish parental rights, it is highly unlikely the state would 
accept their relinquishment because it is highly unlikely the child could be adopted.   
120  The first parent to abandon a child is not charged with neglect as long as there is 
someone else to provide for the child. But if the “last parent standing” exercises similar 
agency, he or she is charged with abandonment and neglect.  ELLMAN ET AL, supra note 
67 at  1127-1139 (discussing general provisions for civil and criminal child abuse and 
neglect proceedings) .  
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pursuant to rigid guidelines which allocate resources to the child based on a 
percentage of what the non-custodial parent earns.121     The constitutionally 
protected parental “`right to the companionship, care, custody and management 
of . . .  children [may be] . . .  an interest far more precious than any property 
right,”122 but there seems much in the law of parenthood that is detrimental to 
parents’ autonomy and property interests.  
 Why do people care so much about entering into these statuses in which they 
compromise so much liberty and property?  It is not just because of the 
expressive value that comes from making these commitments.  To put it in 
economic terms, it is not just because when one weighs the benefits of the 
expressive utils, against the negative utility associated with the restrictions on 
autonomy and property, one still comes out ahead.  It is instead because the 
restrictions on autonomy and property inform and enrich the relationships 
involved, thus providing their own form of positive utility.  The legal incidents of 
marriage and parenthood, though sometimes harsh and restrictive, give meaning 
and content to those relationships and make them, hopefully, independent sources 
of happiness, autonomy and identity.   Thus, the legal restrictions which so 
obviously inhibit individuals’ ability to shape their own lives as individuals help 
create relationships through which people (re)constitute themselves as something 
other than individuals.  
A. The Law and the Importance of the Adult Relationships 
1. Marriage as Constitutive 
Contrary to the once popular slogan suggesting that people need relationships 
the way fish need bicycles,123  it is by now conventional psychological wisdom 
that “[p]eople are constructed in such a fashion that they are inevitably and 
powerfully drawn together . . . wired for intense and persistent involvements with 
one another.”124   Most of the pre-eminent latter 20th century psychoanalytic 
theorists constructed and worked within paradigms that assumed the primacy of 
relationship.125  The foundational work of both Ronald Fairbairn and John 
                                                 
121 See Katharine K. Baker, Supporting Children,  Balancing Lives, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 359, 
362-363 (2007)(explaining child support guidelines).  
122 Santosky v. Kramer, 455 US 745, 758 (1982) (quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. at 
651).  
123 “ A woman needs a man as much as a fish needs a bicycle.”   None of the relational 
theory analyzed in the forthcoming paragraphs suggests that heterosexual attachment is 
necessary, only that attachment is necessary.  Individuals need to exist in relationship 
much more than fish need bicycles.  Who those relationships are with may not matter that 
much at all.  
124 STEPHEN MITCHELL, RELATIONAL CONCEPTS IN PSYCHOANALYSIS:  AN INTEGRATION 
22 (1988)  
125 Object-relations theory, upon which much of the following argument is based, was 
originally shunned by the American Psychoanalytic Association, but later was 
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Bowlby rested on the notion that one of, if not the, central human motivation is 
finding and maintaining strong emotional bonds.126  Libido, in the words of 
Fairbairn, is “primarily object-seeking” not pleasure seeking. ”127  Law professor 
Kenneth Karst puts it in less technical language, “to be human is to need to love 
and be loved.”128   Seeking relationships is a critical part of what human beings 
do. In turn, those relationships become a critical part of who human beings are.   
That the law, particularly constitutional law, has seemed somewhat confused 
about the importance of relationship is not particularly surprising.  Most liberal 
and social contract theory assumes that human beings are ontologically 
autonomous.129 Isolated individualism is thought to be the primal human state, 
and the Bill of Rights was arguably drafted to protect people’s ability to maintain 
their distinctive individual identity free from state interference. 130    From a 
social contract perspective, people can be legally situated in relationship with 
others and develop obligations to those others only because those people 
consented to those relationships and obligations.131  
At some exceedingly broad level, one can characterize both marriage and 
parenthood as choices in this way – one consents to be married for better or 
worse and one assumes the risk of onerous burdens when one becomes a parent -  
but choice is a remarkably thin way to describe how most people experience their 
familial obligations.  One does not choose to take care of a permanently disabled 
spouse or choose to love an obstinate, rude and disloyal child; one just does it.  It 
is more instinctive than chosen precisely because one is not just an individual 
who made commitments that may or may not have been chosen. Instead, one is 
part of a unit. As George Fletcher writes, when it comes to explaining one’s 
                                                                                                                         
incorporated into psychoanalytic thinking.  See PETER FONAGY, ATTACHMENT THEORY 
AND PSYCHOANALYSIS  
126 MITCHELL, supra note 124 at 23-29 
127  Ronald Fairbain,  An Object-relations Theory of the Personality 84 (1952).  See also 
id, at 31 (“The ultimate goal of the libido is the object . . . )The notion that the human  
desire for sex is related to the human desire for relationship could have important 
implications for understanding why and the extent to which the constitution protects 
sexual experience.  See Ian Ayres and Katharine K. Baker,  A Separate Crime of Reckless 
Sex  72 U. CHI. L. REV. 599, 662 (2005)  (arguing that when it has protected sexual 
activity, the Supreme Court has been careful to define that activity as an important 
element of expression  within a relationship, not a protected activity in and of itself)   
128 Kenneth Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L. J. 624, 632 (1980).  
129 For a discussion of how  both liberal and critical legal theorists conceptualize the self 
as ontologically autonomous see Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 1, 14-15 (1988) .   
130 NANCY HIRSCHMAN, RETHINKING OBLIGATION:  FEMINIST METHOD FOR POLITICAL 
THEORY 5 (1992).    
131 Id.  
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primal loyalties, “logic runs dry and one must plant one’s loyalty in the simple 
fact [of belonging.]”132  
One meets others’ needs in family relationships because the interdependence 
that demarcates family obfuscates one’s sense of self.  In Fletcher’s language 
“the distance between subject and object” is blurred.133  Milton Regan writes that 
individuals core attachments “are not externally related to their self-conceptions.  
They are constituent of their identities and  . . .  premises for their agency.”134  
Karst comments that “our intimate associations are powerful influences over the 
development of our personalities.”135   Loyalties and duties to the other are not 
something that one has earned or that one owes or that one chooses to accept, 
they are a matter of self-interest because the self and the other have become 
one.136  
The choice to enter a relationship is thus not just an expression about who 
one wants to be with, it is a choice that alters who one is.137  It is constitutive as 
well as expressive.138 Moreover, as Regan suggests  “spouses . . . don’t simply 
help each other construct separate individual identities . . . [T]hey participate in 
the creation of a shared identity.”139  When the law recognizes marriage, the 
shared identity created by the relationship comes to have a legal status – an 
autonomy - of its own. 
As a matter of doctrine, the Supreme Court has recognized this form of 
marital autonomy only once, in Griswold v. Connecticut – when it a articulated a 
                                                 
132 GEORGE FLETCHER, LOYALTY 61 (Here Fletcher it talking about the experience of 
loyalty generally. When discussing spouses in particular, he suggests that the marital 
evidentiary privileges essentially operate as privileges against self-incrimination because 
the distance between the object and the subject becomes so blurred that hurting oen’s 
spouse is hurting oneself. Id. At 81). 
133 Id. 
134 MILTON REGAN, ALONE TOGETHER :  LAW AND THE MEANINGS OF MARRIAGE  24 
(1998). 
135 Karst, supra note 128 at 636. 
136 See LAURENCE D. HOULGATE, FAMILY AND STATE 39 (1988)  (describing solicitude 
not as something that he owes his family members but as instinctive obligation)  See also, 
MILTON REGAN, FAMILY LAW AND THE PURSUIT OF INTIMACY 113 (1993) (one dives into 
to save a drowning child (or spouse) as much to serve one’s own interest as the other’s.)   
137 Or at least it can alter who one is and, for relationships that do work out, it does alter 
who one is.  
138 For more on the constitutive aspects of accepting responsibility, see Meir Dan-Cohen, 
Responsibility and the Boundaries of the Self, 105 HARV. L. REV. 959 (1992) (developing 
the constitutive responsibility paradigm and suggesting that a person’s responsibilities 
define who a person is)   
139 REGAN, FAMILY LAW supra note 136 at 94.  
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right to marital privacy that allowed married couples to use contraceptives.140  In 
Griswold, the court famously wrote:  
Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully 
enduring and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an association 
that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not 
political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects.  
Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our 
prior decisions.141  
Seven years later, in Eisenstadt v. Baird142 when the court found that unmarried 
individuals also had a right to contraceptives, Justice Brennan suggested that 
marital autonomy might not exist at all.  “[T]he marital couple is not an 
independent entity with a mind and heart of its own, but an association of two 
individuals each with a separate intellectual and emotional makeup.”143   
 There is very little way to square this individualistic language in Eisenstadt 
with the notions of unity in Griswold.144 Technically, one need not do so because 
subsequent cases strongly suggest there is an  individual right to be free from 
state interference into reproductive decision-making (a right that would attach to 
the plaintiffs in both Eisenstadt and Griswold).145  But if Griswold is nothing 
more than a case about contraception, it would make no sense to quote it, as the 
Supreme Court has consistently done, in the later cases having to do with family 
relationships in general and marriage in particular.146  Moreover, there is a long, 
                                                 
140 381 US 479, 484 (1965). In finding a right to marital privacy, the Court relied heavily 
on cases that afforded privacy to the relationship between parents and children, Meyer v. 
Nebraska 262 US 390 (1923) (state cannot prohibit parents from hiring someone to teach 
their children a language other than English) Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 US 510 
(1925) (state cannot require children to attend public school if there is an adequate private 
alternative). 
141 381 US at 486. 
142 405 US 438 (1972) (Eisenstadt involved state restrictions on the distribution of 
contraceptives to unmarried  people.)   
143 405 US at 453.  
144  See supra note 76.  
145 See Roe v. Wade, 410 US 113 (1973)  (restricting the state’s ability to prohibit 
abortion); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 US 52 (1976)  (striking down required 
spousal notification before abortion decision); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 US 833 
(1992) (“Our law affords constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to 
marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationship, child rearing . . . “)   
146  See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 US 645, 651 (1972)  (involving the right to paternal status, 
citing Griswold); Smith v. OFFER, 431 US 110, 123 (1977) (involving the constitutional 
rights of foster parents, citing Griswold);  Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 US 494, 
495 (1977)  (involving  the rights of extended family members to be treated as a family, 
citing Griswold); Zablocki v. Redhail, supra note 55, 434 at 385 (right to marry, citing 
Griswold); See also In Re Marriage Cases, supra note 1, 49 Cal Rptr 3d at 715 (right to 
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deep and venerable common law history of treating the marital unit as an entity, 
with an autonomy of its own.147   Justice Brennan completely ignored this well-
established law in suggesting that married people do not constitute a unit.  The 
law has always treated married people as an entity for economic, evidentiary, and 
other legal purposes. 148   In Martha Fineman’s words, the doctrine “articulate[s] . 
. . what might be characterized as an ethic or ideology of family privacy,”149  
which she goes on to re-articulate as autonomy.  
 The autonomous treatment the law affords relationships enables a universe, 
or at least a community, that serves as a buffer against the outside world.    
“When we come home to our families,” writes Laurence Houlgate “we return to a 
relationship of intimacy, defined by conditions of mind, not overt action, by 
trusts and devotion, instead of formal rules and duty.”150   The abstract and 
formalistic relationships that define most peoples’ non-family life leave us 
searching for relationships that operate differently.  Families provide those 
relationships by “emphasizing ‘shared commitment’ rather than rules.”151 
 In her analysis of Americans’ understanding of fairness, Jennifer Hochschild 
observes that norms of distribution and desert vary in different realms.152  In the 
socializing domain (which she describes as family, school, and friends) norms of 
equality and need predominate.  What one is entitled to (love, care, even material 
goods, sometimes) depends not on what one has accomplished or what one 
promised, but simply on the fact that one is a member of that domain.  Indeed, 
                                                                                                                         
marry, citing Griswold); Goodridge v. Dept. of Pub Health, supra note 7, 798 NE2d at 
955 (right to marry, citing Griswold).   
147 McGuire v. McGuire is the most famous case. 59 NWd 336 (Neb. 1953).  In McGuire, 
the Nebraska court refused to find justiciable a wife’s claim to a higher living standard 
even though it was clear that the couple could afford to live more comfortably.    
148 The legal treatment of the marital relationship has been subject to severe criticism by 
feminists, see Reva Siegal, “The Rule of Love:”  Wife Beating as Prerogative and 
Privacy, 105 YALE L. J 2117, 2161-2170 (notion of marital unity emerged to bar women 
from suing their husbands even as the common law evolved to allow married women to 
sue others in tort and contract.)  Siegal refers the ways in which the law maintains 
traditional coverture principles that rob married women of their rights as individuals as 
“preservation through transformation.”  Id. at  2121.  See also Katharine B. Silbaugh, 
Turning Labor into Love:  Housework and the Law, 91 NORTHWESTERN L. REV. 1, 
(1996)  (demonstrating how the law views women’s labor as intrinsic to the marital 
relationship, not as an independent source of entitlement.)  Part IIIB2 elaborates on the 
feminist critique of marriage.  
149 Martha Fineman, What Place for Family Privacy, 67 GEO WASH L REV 1207, 1215 
(1999)  
150 HOULGATE supra note 136 at 35.   
151 Karst, supra note 128 at 639.   
152 Jennifer Hocschild, What’s Fair:  American Beliefs About Redistributive Justice 47-
50 (1981).   
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psychological literature suggests that “promoting an ‘exchange orientation’ may 
be inimical to the process of establishing intimacy.  It leads people to monitor 
their partners and keep running accounts in a way that makes momentary 
violations [too] salient. . . . .”153  It is being in the family, not what one does in 
the family that determines entitlement, just as it is being in the family, not what 
one has promised, that determines obligation.154  The strength of the familial 
norms of entitlement explain how family can operate as such a haven.  One is 
entitled because one is of the family.  One need not prove anything.  
 The law honors these alternative norms of entitlement by leaving the families 
alone while in tact and by emphasizing membership not contribution at 
dissolution. As Fineman writes, the “ideology of state non-intervention is rooted 
in idealization, but also references the perceived pragmatics of family 
relationships and the acknowledged limitations of legal . . . systems as substitutes 
for family decision-making.”155  By  refusing to import its own rules, the law 
encourages parties to work things out on their own, to forge their own sense of 
purpose as an entity, and to develop norms that facilitate their lives together.  The 
process of working it out bolsters a sense of intimacy precisely because the 
abstract and formalistic rules of law have no relevance.  There are no universal 
truths for relationships.156  
                                                 
153 John G. Holmes and Susan D. Boon, Developments in the Field of Close 
Relationships:  Creating Foundations for Intervention Strategies, 16 PERS SOC PSYCHOL 
BULL 23, 27 (1990). See also Lenahan O’Connell, An Exploration of Exchange in Three 
Social Relationships:  Kinship, Friendship and the Marketplace, 1 J. OF SOC AND PERS 
RELAT. 333, 341-342 (1984) (finding no reciprocity norm in exchanges between kin 
members and close friends.  “Many believe that friendship and kinship bestow a license 
to request help without imposing any imperative obligation to reciprocate.”)  
154  The familial norm of entitlement is very different than one’s sense of entitlement in 
more public spheres. Hochschild suggests that inequality norms are acceptable and even 
preferable in the market domain, where there is an acceptable theory of desert that 
explains disparity.  HOCHSCHILD, supra note 152 at 49.  Equality is the operative norm in 
the political realm, but it is not material or emotional goods that are distributed in that 
realm, it is political rights. (To the extent that one asks Americans to view economic 
rights as political rights, they usually deny or transform the hypothetical. Id. At 48).   
Law plays a huge role in constructing the theories of desert in the market domain and in 
constructing the nature of the participatory rights in the political realm, but it plays much 
of less of a role in the social domain.  It defines the social domain and then usually lets 
distributions within that domain work themselves out, until parties within the domain call 
on the law to interfere, i.e. at divorce or termination of parental rights.   
155 Fineman, supra note 149 at 1214.   
156 As Hillary Clinton commented at a time when the entire world was looking at her 
marriage through a microscope and wondering how it could possibly work, “I have 
learned a long time ago that the only people who count in any marriage are the two 
people that are in it.”  Maureen Downey, Saturday Talk. THE ATLANTA JOURNAL AND 
CONSTITUTION, Jan. 31, 1998.  
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 The intimacy and trust of family relationships, an intimacy and trust born 
from sharing not only day-to-day life, but also the “distinctly personal aspects of 
one’s life”157 create “attachments and commitments”158 that the law honors by 
making exit difficult and by refusing to interfere in most day-to-day life.159   
These restrictions are simultaneously taxing and liberating.  “Bonds of lasting 
intimacy leave family members undeniably vulnerable, but the same relationships 
and loyalties that seem to tie us down are, paradoxically, the sources of strength 
most likely to lift us up.”160  
 The law’s treatment of relationships thus privileges the entity over the 
individual. Through property rules161 explicit statutes,162and common law 
duties,163 the law sets norms not just for sharing, but for fusing, for making it 
difficult for individuals to think about their property or their needs as distinct 
from those of their partners.  In setting these norms, the law facilitates the 
fulfillment what may be core - or at least a widely held -  human needs to 
transcend self in the context of relationship. 
 When legal relationships dissolve and the law does get involved in 
distributing financial assets, courts do not focus on particular individual 
contributions or needs, at least if the relationship has been relatively long-lasting.  
For the most part, courts distribute all property earned during the marriage 
evenly, regardless of who earned it.164  With regard to maintenance, the divorce 
reforms in the 1970s and 1980s endorsed  the idea of making maintenance a 
                                                 
157 Roberts v. United States Jaycees,468 US 609, 619-20 (1984).  
158 Id.  Regan also suggests that trust flows from the intimacy of day to day life.  “Trust 
“can flow out of the progress of a relationship with another, as daily  experience 
incrementally and almost imperceptibly creates a milieu in which persons come to trust 
each other. . . . “ REGAN, ALONE TOGETHER, supra note 134 at 25 
159 The refusal to interfere, as manifested in the spousal immunity doctrines, the 
evidentiary privileges and the common law doctrine of non-interference, see McGuire v. 
McGuire, supra note 147, is a common law, not a constitutional doctrine.  It operates in 
much the same way as the constitutional doctrine of parental autonomy does though.  See 
infra part IVB1.   
160 Bruce C. Hafen, The Family as an Entity, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV 865, 912  (1989).  
161 See infra note 164-66.   
162 See e.g. Cal. Civil Code §5132 “A married person shall support the person’s spouse 
while they are living together, “ § 4802 “a husband and wife cannot, by any contract with 
each other, alter their legal relationship, except a to property . . . “.  
163 For instance, the necessaries doctrine requires a spouse, if able, to pay for another 
spouse’s “necessaries.”  See ELLMAN ET AL, supra note 67 at 159-161.  
164 At divorce, all property earned during the marriage is considered either community 
property (in community property states) or marital property (in common law 
jurisdictions).  See HARRIS, TEITELBAUM AND CARBONE,  supra note 34 at 98-40.  
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function of individual need or contribution,165 but recent judicial and statutory 
trends have rejected these reforms as inimical to the idea of marriage and shifted 
the emphasis to the length of the marriage (the amount of time of belonging) not 
individual sacrifice or entitlement. 166  In other words, whatever one contributed 
or did as a spouse, if one was married for long enough, one is entitled to 
maintenance.  It is the fact of belonging that matters.167  
2.  Marriage as Oppressive?  
This noble and psychological story about how and why the law respects 
relationship has thus far (purposefully) neglected to mention how very 
devastating the traditional treatment of relationship has been for many women, 
notwithstanding property and maintenance laws designed to protect them 
somewhat.   As Lee Teitelbaum recognized over 20 years ago, “[w]hen courts 
refuse to resolve . . .  [intra-family] disputes, that decision is sounded on the 
principle of family autonomy . . . . [H]owever, the practical consequence of 
many, if not all, of these decisions is to confer or ratify the power of one family 
member over others.168    Despite the reciprocal rights and obligations that the 
law imposed on husbands and wives, for hundreds of years, it was all too clear 
that the refusal of the law to interfere let a man abandon or ignore his obligations 
to his spouse and/or use force against his wife if he thought that, for any reason, 
she was ignoring her obligations.169  Because women had so few options in life 
                                                 
165 See ELLMAN ET AL, supra note 67 at 363-364 (discussing “reforms” in alimony laws) 
and at  380-386 (discussing the problems with the rationales that alimony “reform” relied 
on) .  
166 See id.   at  386 “Marital duration appears to be a critical factor for nearly every court 
asked to make an award for ‘support alimony’ – alimony with no definite termination 
date that is intended to provide the obligee with a more comfortable living standard.”   . 
See also ALI PRINCIPLES supra note 34, § 5.04 Cmt. C “Despite the conceptual  
difficulties with the contract and contribution rationales, the cases reflect an enduring 
intuition that the homemaker in a long-term marriage has some claim on the other 
spouse’s post-divorce income. That intuition does not depend on any assumption that the 
parties made explicit promises to one another, but on the belief that the relationship itself 
gives rise to obligations.   . . . The remedy is proportional to the marital duration because 
the obligations recognized under this section do not arise from the marriage ceremony 
alone, but develop over time as the parties’ lives become entwined.” 
167 Comparably, child support awards are set pursuant to rigid statutory grids as a way of 
preventing judges from making individual assessments about children’s needs or desires. 
What a child is entitled to is a function of the fact of her legal relationship to her parent, 
not as a function of her particular situation.  See Baker, Bargaining or Biology, supra 
note 38 at 7-8.      
168 See Lee Teitelbaum, Family History and Family Law, 1985 Wis. L Rev. 1135, 1144.  
169 See Elizabeth Schneider, The Violence of Privacy 23 CONN. L. REV. 973 (1991) 
(analyzing the myriad ways that privacy doctrine has allowed men to control and abuse 
women in marriage).     
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outside of marriage, they were completely dependent on the largesse of their 
husbands within it. 
The fact that for centuries marriage has served as an institution that allowed 
the law to subordinate women’s property interests and ignore women’s physical 
and emotional well-being might well auger in favor of constitutional suspicion of 
marriage, not reification of it.  One could easily argue that the equality principles 
embedded in the Equal Protection Clause require the law to scrutinize the ways 
in which the law  privileges relationship precisely because, as Teitelbaum 
observed, by privileging relationships the law privileges the more powerful at the 
expense of the less powerful and thereby denies the less powerful full voice and 
participation in society.     
Furthermore, the legal recognition of marriage may not be that important to 
women because they are already more likely to experience life as a web of 
connection to others.   Women may not need marriage because they do not crave 
intimacy the way men do;170 as Robin West writes, “We just do it.  It is 
ridiculously easy.”171  Perhaps, when the Supreme Court has referred to the 
human flourishing that marriage enables,172 it has been seeing the world through 
a distinctly male lens, and whatever values may be served by fostering the 
intimacy of marriage, those values pale in comparison to the equality concerns 
that seem antithetical to it.   
Reasonable minds may well disagree on this question.  The contemporary 
empirical evidence continues to show that the vast majority of women marry,173 
even more women express a desire to marry,174  and those women who do marry 
                                                 
170 See Katharine K. Baker, Property Rules Meet Feminist Needs:  Respecting Autonomy 
by Valuing Connection, 59 OHIO ST. L J 1523, 1549-1558 (1998) (describing how the 
traditional justifications for the treatment of marriage ignore the substantial feminist 
literature that suggests that women may crave and need formalism and independence not 
altruism and intimacy because caring and connection seem to come so much more easily 
to women)  Even if this is true, however, women may still support state-sponsored 
marriage because they recognize that the traditional legal treatment of relationship  helps 
men overcome a more individualistic outlook toward life.  See Baker, id. 1595 (“wives 
may benefit from the extent to which legal protection of marriage encourages their 
husbands to become more caring, intimate, and selfless.”) 
171 West, supra note 127 at 18.( “Intimacy is not something which women fight to 
become capable of. We just do it. It is ridiculously easy.”)   The gendered facility with 
intimacy may explain why, historically, marriage has been more psychologically 
beneficial to men.  See generally STEVEN NOCK, MARRIAGE IN MEN’S LIVES (1998).    
172 See Griswold, supra note 141.   
173 U.S. Census, S2201, 2006 American Community Survey.  Of women over age 15, 
only 27.3% are never married.  Of women between the ages of 35-44, only 16.4% are 
never married.   
174 Polling Nations, questions to 13-24 year olds, 52 % definitely want to get married and 
40% probably want to get married.  http://poll.orspub.com .   
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are happier, healthier and wealthier than those who do not. 175    To be sure, there 
are endogeneity concerns with this data.  Marriage may make people happier, 
healthier and wealthier, but happy, healthy and wealthy people are probably more 
likely to marry.176  Moreover, state policies and norms supporting marriage help 
explain why married people would feel happier (they are comporting with a 
social norm), healthier (they have easier access to health insurance) and wealthier 
(they get preferable tax treatment).177   Maybe the only reason women want to 
marry is because they will be considered normal and get access to health care and 
tax benefits.  After all, there are numerous women who cherish their “emotional 
individualism”178 and flourish both psychologically and materially outside the 
confines of marriage.  Maybe if the state stopped supporting marriage, women 
would run from it. 
Maybe.  But at times it seems as if the feminist critique of marriage is 
running into the same road block that the feminist critique of sexuality did.179  
For much of the 1980s feminism consistently emphasized how women’s 
                                                 
175 Steven Nock writes “The many beneficial effects of marriage are well-known. Married 
people are generally healthier; they live longer, earn more, have better health and better 
sex lives, and are happier than their unmarried counterparts.  . . . Some disagreement may 
exist about the magnitude of such effects, but they are almost certainly the result of 
marriage, rather than self-selection.”  See STEVEn NOCK MARRIAGE IN MEN’S LIVES 3 
(1998) (citing numerous studies).   For a more recent study, see Alois Sututzer and Bruno 
Frey, Does marriage make people happy or do happy people get married, 35 J. OF SOCIO-
ECONOMICS 326, 3---  (2006) (finding that marriage continues to be highly correlated 
with happiness for both men and women and that “[i]t is unlikely that . . . selection 
effects can explain the entire difference in well-being between singles and married 
people.”) See also, Goive Marriage, M. Hughes and C. Style, The Family Life Cycle – 
Internal Dynamics and Social Research Consequences, 58 Sociology and Social Res. 56-
68 (1983)  (marriage improves women’s lives substantially).   
176 Depressed, sick and poor people are not seen as particularly good marital prospects. 
Nonetheless, the  studies cited in the note above suggest that it is unlikely that the 
benefits of marriage could be entirely do to selection effects.  
177 See Bernstein, supra note 8 at 161-163 (and notes cited therein).  
178 See Rachel F. Moran, How Second-Wave Feminist Forgot the Single Woman, 33 
Hofstra L . Rev 223, 228 (2004).  
179 For recent contributions to the feminist critique of marriage and legal family, see 
Laura A Rosenbury, Friends With Benefits, 106 MICH L REV 189, 212 (2007) (“Elevating 
[family relationships] over friendships contributes to gender inequality by encouraging 
individuals to engage in domestic coupling rooted in a history of patriarchy and then 
stigmatizing those who lie outside of that coupling” (citations omitted)); Dan Markel, 
Jennifer Collins, and Ethan Leib, Criminal Justice and the Challenge of Family Ties, 
2007 ILL. L. REV 1147, 1190 (“the family often served (and in some cases, continue[s] to 
serve) to perpetuate patriarchy, gender hierarchy, or domestic violence.”) See also, Nancy 
Polikoff, We Will Get What We Ask For:  Why Legalizing Gay and Lesbian Marriage 
Will Not Dismantle the Legal Structure of Gender in Every Marriage, 110 U VA L REV 
1555 (1993) .  
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subordination was sexualized and how sexualized domination permeated 
women’s lives.180  In the words of Catharine MacKinnon, women’s sexuality was 
“defined by men, forced on women, and constitutive of the meaning of 
gender.”181   In response, numerous women - many of them self-defined feminists 
- challenged the feminist orthodoxy asking (to paraphrase Kathryn Abrams)  
“what are we supposed to do about sex while we are fighting for freedom?”182  
The numerous women - many of them feminists - who continue to enter into the 
institution of marriage may be asking a comparable question, “what are we 
supposed to do about family while we are fighting for freedom?”    
Much of the feminist critique of marriage argues that marriage is, as 
MacKinnon said women’s sexuality was, “defined by men, forced on women and 
constitutive of the meaning of gender.”183  Yet despite what has been a century of 
feminist criticism of marriage,184 there still appears to be something in marriage 
that many women – including women with a strong commitment to gender 
equality – value. 185  Even while conceding that the institution of marriage is 
deeply infused with patriarchal norms and hidden forms of oppression, most 
women enter it willingly.  It could be that most women are just terribly 
misguided about how bad marriage will be, or it could be that many women have 
                                                 
180 Kathryn Abrams, Sex Wars Redux, 95 COL. L. REV. 304, 307-310.  
181 CATHARINE MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 149 (1989).  
182 Abrams, supra note 180 at 311(“sex radicals argued [that] the subordination of 
pleasure to a virtually exclusive focus on identifying and preventing danger deprived 
women of a resource vital to self-understanding and resistance. The sex radicals asked 
“what women were supposed to do about sex while they were fighting for freedom.””)   
183 See Rosenbury, supra note 179 at 219 (“marriage, as shaped by the state, plays a vital 
role in maintaining gender inequality”); Markel, Collins and Leib, supra note 179 at 1193 
(“benefits to the family facilitate the perpetuation of gender hierarchy and domestic 
violence”); Polikoff, supra note 179 at 1536 (marriage is “the worst of mainstream 
society” and “an inherently problematic institution.”).  
184 For early critiques see Emma Goldman, Marriage and Love, in Red Emma Speaks 
158, 164-`65 (Alix Kates Shuman ed., 1972) (The institution of marriage makes a 
parasite of woman . . . It incapacitates her for life’s struggle, annihilates her social 
consciousness, paralyzes her imagination, and then imposes it gracious protection, which 
is in reality a snare, a travesty on human character.”)  
185  Commitment to gender equality is correlated to educational level, as is marriage rate.  
For the link between commitment to gender equality and education, see Richard J. Harris 
& Juanita M. Firestone, Changes in Predictors of GenderRole Ideologies Among Women:  
A Mutlivariate Analysis, 38 SEX ROLES 239, 240 (1998). Fro the link between marriage 
rate and education, see    Detp. Health and Human Services, Natl. Center for Health 
Statistics, Cohabitation,, Marriage, Divorce and Remarriage in the United States 4 
(2002) (“In addition to race and employment status, other characteristics of individuals 
that have been found to be related to higher probability of getting married include higher 
education and earnings.”)  See 
http://wwwaamft.org/Press_Room/CDC_series23_7_2002.pdf 
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decided that there is something worthwhile in the marital norms that state and 
culturally sponsored marriage impart.  The analysis above suggests that what 
women may value is the human flourishing that seems to flow from fusion with 
another and the nourishment one gets from a defined community that can close 
its doors to the outside world.186  
This line of argument would also explain why so many gay men and lesbians 
want to get married.  Some commentators bemoan the elevation of “we” 
language in contemporary gay discourse,187 but there is little doubt that within the 
gay community there is a strong endorsement of the we.188  Committed, 
interdependent, hard-to-break relationships matter powerfully to people and the 
law plays a role in making those relationships more committed, interdependent 
and hard to break. When the law recognizes marital relationships, it fosters and 
facilitates the formative and constitutive roles that those relationships can play in 
people’s lives. 
B. The Law and the Importance of Parental Relationships  
1. Parenthood as Constitutive 
When the law recognizes parental relationships, it fosters and facilitates the 
formative and constitutive role that parenthood plays in people’s lives also. The 
justification for the legal treatment of parenthood almost perfectly parallels the 
justification for the legal treatment of marriage.  Parenthood enables people to 
feel powerful love, to fuse with others and to reconstitute themselves in the 
context of relationship.  Like marriage partners, children are critical sources of 
love.  Adults have children, Jeffrey Bluestein writes “not because . . . [children] 
will continue the family, or are potential sources of relief and aid,  but because 
they are new bonds of love.”189  Like marriage, parenthood requires a 
relinquishment of self, a fusing of self with other such that a parent’s decision to 
                                                 
186  As Anne Dailey remarked “while the closed doors of the home have shielded abuse, 
isolation and exploitation, they have at the same time nurtured love and commitment.”  
Anne Dailey,  Constitutional Privacy and the Just Family, 67 TULANE L. REV. 955, 1021 
(1993).  
187 See Katherine M. Franke, The Politics of Same-Sex Marriage Politics, 15 COLUM. J. 
GENDER & L. 236, 239 (2006) (“the rights-bearing subject of the lesbigay right 
movement has now3  become ‘the couple’ – a We. It is a domesticated couple and it is a 
couple that seeks a particular location within a genealogical kinship grid that sutures the 
couple to the nation.” ) 
188 See e.g., JONATHAN RAUCH, GAY MARRIAGE (2004) and the numerous same sex 
marriage cases brought by claimants eager to be considered a “we.” 
189 Jeffrey Blustein, Child Rearing and Family Interests, in HAVING CHILDREN 115, 118 
(Onora O’neill & William Ruddick eds,. 1979).   
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run into a burning building to save her child can hardly be construed as an act of 
altruism.190 It is an act of self-interest.  
Being a parent is also a means of re-constructing oneself.191  Parenting 
requires  accepting the responsibility that allows one to achieve what Katharine 
Bartlett refers to as an “ennobled self.”192   The ability to construct oneself in this 
ennobled way, to accept the responsibility for “nurturing and loving and 
educating one’s children . . . is central to our conception of human 
flourishing.”193   As David Richards suggests “[c]hild-rearing is one of the ways 
in which many people fulfill and express their deepest values about how life is to 
be lived.”194 
The constitutional parental rights cases, including Meyer v. Nebraska,195 
Pierce v. Socy of Sisters,196 Prince v. Mass.,197 Wisconsin v. Yoder,198 and 
Parham v. J.R.,199 particularly when coupled with other “parent-like” cases, 
Moore v. City of East Cleveland,200 and Smith v. OFFER,201recognize that 
parenthood plays a key constitutive role in people’s lives.  Thus, allowing the 
state to bar parents from pursuing certain desired educational  paths for their 
children would offend the “relation between individual and state . . . upon which 
our institutions rest”202  because restrictions on children almost inevitably operate 
as restrictions on parents also.  An adult must be free to steer a child in the “ways 
                                                 
190 Mit Regan explores this kind of hypothetical, suggesting that a stranger’s decision to 
rescue a drowning child can barely be analyzed on the same terms as a mother’s because 
the mother’s “decision” seems so much like an instinctive at of self-preservation. REGAN 
supra note 136 at 113.  
191 At a colloquial level every parent understands this. That is why so many parents come 
to see their lives as having two very distinct phases, pre-children and parental, and those 
phases are not just about sleep deprivation and the facility with which one changes a 
diaper or installs a car seat. 
192 Katharine T. Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood, 98 YALE L. J. 293, 301  (1988) 
(citing Nel Noddings, CARING:  A FEMININE APPROACH TO ETHICS AND MORAL 
EDUCATION 5) (1984)). 
193  Stephen Gilles, On Educating Children:  A Parentalist Manifesto, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 
938, 962 (1996)  
194 David A. J. Richards, The Individual, The Family and The Constitution, A 
Jurisprudential Perspective, 55 NYU L. REV 1, 28 (1980).  
195 262 US 390 (1923). 
196 268 US 510 (1925). 
197 321 US 158 (1944) 
198 406 US 205 (1972). 
199 442 US 584 (1979).  
200 Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 US 494 (1977). 
201 Smith v. OFFER, 431 US 816 (1977) 
202 Meyer, 262 US at. 628. 
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he should go.”203   The state cannot “standardize its children” by requiring that 
they go to public school.204  In dissent, in Bowers v. Hardwick, Justice Blackmun 
wrote that the Constitution protects parenthood because “parenthood alters so 
dramatically an individual’s self-definition.”205   The parent- child relationship 
serves as a source of independent identity for both parent and child.   
The Court has also made clear that the “the importance of the familial 
relationship, to the individuals involved and to the society, stems from the 
emotional attachments that derive from the intimacy of daily association, and 
from the role it plays in ‘promoting a way of life’.”206   “It is through the family 
that we inculcate and pass down many of our most cherished values, moral and 
cultural.”207  In Prince (a parenthood case), the Court foreshadowed the language 
in Griswold (a marriage case), referring to the interests at stake in child-rearing 
as “sacred.”208  That sacredness was made all the more explicit in Wisconsin v. 
Yoder,209 which respected parents’ rights to withdraw their children from public 
school at age 14 because the rights of parents include the right to raise children 
within the tenets of the Amish religion.  It was impossible to afford the parents 
religious freedom without affording them parental freedom because the freedom 
to believe and act in accordance with their religious beliefs, a freedom that we 
often consider a basic individual right, includes a basic relational right, the right 
to raise one’s children in accordance with those beliefs.   
The way the Constitution honors the potential for people to enrich and define 
themselves through parenthood is by leaving the parental relationship alone.  “It 
is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the 
parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations 
the state can neither supply nor hinder.”210   Parents are allowed to structure their 
relationships with their children as they choose. There are mandatory schooling 
laws, and child labor restrictions and the outside boundaries of abuse and neglect, 
                                                 
203 Prince, 321 US at 164 (referring to parent’s interest in raising child as “sacred private 
interests”).  
204 Pierce v. Socy of Sisters,  268 US 510, 535 (1925) 
205 Bowers v.Hardwick, 478 US 186, 205 (1985) (Blackmun, J. dissenting) (citing Moore 
at 500-06).  Bowers had to do with a  consensual sexual relationship between two adults 
(in some sense, marriage-like);  Moore had to do with a relationship between a 
grandmother and her grandchild (in some sense parent-like).  Again, when the Court 
writes about why it protects either marriage or parenthood, it tends to conflate the 
reasons. 
206 Smith v. OFFER, 431 US at 843  (quoting Griswold) 
207 Moore,  431 US at 503-04.  
208 Prince, 321 US at 165. See also Griswald, supra note 141 (marriage is “intimate to the 
degree of being sacred.”) 
209 406 US 205 (1972). 
210 Prince v. Mass., 321 US 158, 166 (1944). 
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but, for the most part, the state steers clear of interfering with the parental 
relationship.  Parents are presumed to act in their children’s best interest.211  As 
recently as 1989, Justice Brennan re-affirmed the soundness of the substantive 
due process cases that treated the parental relationship as outside of the ambit of 
state regulation.212   
In most of these cases, the Court was not careful to separate out the interests 
of the parents and the interests of the children,213 and in Parham v. J.R., the court 
realized that such an effort was probably pointless. The child’s “interest is 
inextricably linked with the parents’ interest in and obligation for the welfare and 
the health of the child.”214  Child and parent are one for legal purposes.215  
2. The Parallels to Marriage  
This explication of the parental rights cases suggests that parenthood and 
marriage are protected for comparable reasons.  Indeed, the parental rights cases, 
more explicitly than the marriage cases, explain why it is that the law needs to 
care about relationship rights and obligations at all.  The law needs to honor 
family relationship rights because family relationships provide critical sources of 
identity.  They steer people in directions they would not go but for the 
relationship.216  They afford people a sense of  being “inextricably linked” with 
another,217 and they treat “rights and high dut[ies]”218 as coming of a piece.  
                                                 
211  Parham v. J.R., 442 US 584 (1979).  
212  Citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 US 390 (1923) and Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 US 
510 (1925), Justice Brennan wrote “ I think I am safe in saying that no doubts the wisdom 
or validiy of those decisions.”  Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 US 110, 143 (1989) 
(Brennan, J. dissenting).  
213 But see Justice Douglas dissenting  in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 US 205, 244 (1972)  
(“On this important and vital matter of education, I think the children should be entitled 
to be heard”).  See also Woodhouse, supra note 13 (arguing that the refusal to consider 
the children’s perspectives in Meyer and Pierce reflects a paradigm that inappropriately 
treats children as property.).  
214 442 US 548 [2503].  The Court acknowledged that “some parents may at times act 
against the interest of their children . . but [that] is hardly reason to discard wholesale 
those pages of human experience that teach that parents generally do act in the children’s 
best interest.” [2504]. 
215  In Troxel v. Granville, 530 US 57 (2000), the Court backtracked from this position 
somewhat, finding that grandparents may have a right to visit their grandchildren against 
the wishes of a parent, if it is in the child’s best interest.   Courts are still required to 
(rebuttably) presume, however, that parents do act in the best  interest of their children.  
216 See Prince 321 US at 164 (parents have the right to steer children “in the way they 
should go.”) 
217 Parham, 442 US at 2503-04. 
218 Pierce,  268 US at 535.  
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Family relationships allow us to share the “intimacy of daily association”219 
which in turn allows us to “pass on our most cherished values . . . .”220    
In his article on marriage, Cass Sunstein writes that when the Court evaluated 
the constitutional dimensions of marriage it “went off track [and into the cases 
involving parenting and procreation] because of the intuitive connection between 
sexuality and reproduction (protected by substantive due process) and marriage 
(not easily analyzed in the same terms).”221  To assume that marriage cannot be 
analyzed in the same terms as parenting and procreation may well be to assume 
something wrong about the legal treatment of parenting or marriage, however.  
Marriage, like parenthood, shapes identity.   Both marriage and parenthood create 
sources of loyalty and intimacy that root one in something other than oneself or 
the state222  In striking down the regulations in Meyer and Pierce, the Court 
emphasized the important mediating function that families can play as an interim 
institution between the individual and the state.223  By citing Meyer and Pierce in 
Griswald224 and Zablocki,225 the Court suggested that marriage plays that 
intermediary role as well. 
Comparably, the birth control and abortion cases, decided under substantive 
due process doctrine, say something about the constitutional import of 
                                                 
219 Smith v. OFFER, 431 US at 844. ,  
220 Moore,  431 US at 503-04 
221 Sunstein, supra note 8 at 2097.   
222 Intermediary institutions can be critical sources of identity, see Anne C. Dailey, 
Federalism and Families, 143 U PENN L. REV 1787, 1858-1960 (1995) (discussing the 
communitarian argument about the “constitutive effect that social affiliations have on the 
development of the human identity.”) 
and critical buffers from the state.  As Jean Eshtain writes, “it is no coincidence that all 
20th century totalitarian orders labored to destroy the family as a locus of identity and 
meaning apart from the state.” JEAN ELSHTAIN, THE FAMILY AND CIVIC LIFE 55   For 
more on the importance of intermediary  institutions, see Gerald E. Frug, The City as a 
Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1059, 1088 (1980).   
223  The Court in Meyer explained that American values were critically different than 
those proposed by  Plato in the IDEAL COMMONWEALTH.  Plato described a world in 
which all training of young males was the responsibility of the state.  The Court wrote:  
“Although such measures have been deliberately approved by men of great genius, their 
ideas touching the relation between individual and the state were wholly different from 
those upon which our institutions rest.”  262 US at 402.  In Prince the Court wrote, “The 
child is not the mere creature of the state;  those who nurture him and direct his destiny 
have the right, couples with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional 
obligation. “  268 US 510 at 535.  For more on this, see Dailey, supra, note 186 at 1017 
(“constitutional protection of the family ought to reflect an understanding of the family’s 
distinct role as a vital interim institution serving the communal ends of political life”)   
224 381 US at 481. 
225 434 US at 381. 
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relationship.  The liberty interests served both by allowing people to procreate226 
and allowing them not to227 have everything to do with affording people some 
measure of control over which and what kind of relationships will come to define 
them.  The rights to abortion and birth control are not just about the rights to be 
free of an unwanted pregnancy, they are about the rights to be free of unwanted 
relationships.228 Those rights are important because of the ways in which 
relationships, particularly relationships that are understood by the parties and by 
others to be familial, define who we are.229 
C. Summary 
Just as the analogy to marital status helped elucidate what claims to parental 
status are, so the analogy to parental rights helps elucidate why the law should 
(or must) recognize marriage-like relationships. The parental rights cases suggest 
that the legal rights and obligations that accompany family relationship play a 
formidable and constitutive role in who is.  The status of the parental figures in 
these cases was never doubt. What was in doubt was the extent to which that 
status included the right to be treated as legally connected and why. The cases 
suggest that the totality of the legal incidents associated with legally recognized 
relationships, including claims on the other, obligations to the other, and the right 
to be considered as a unit, shape people’s understanding of who they are.  This 
understanding of why parental relationships are important to parents and children 
                                                 
226 Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 US 535 (1942)  (striking down a state law requiring 
sterilization of developmentally disabled people)  
227 See abortion and procreation cases, supra notes 52 and 145.    
228 Admittedly, this right is gendered. Women have the right to terminate a potential 
relationship in a way that men do not and because a mother can effectively prevent a 
father from relinquishing his paternal relationship, see Baker, Bargaining or Biology, 
supra note 38 at 9-10.  Men can have parental relationships forced on them.  This 
gendered (and arguably unfair) treatment of relationship in the parental context may have 
come from the recognition that for years men just walked away from parental 
relationships without much fear of ever being dragged back into them., legally or 
emotionally. 
229 To suggest that the constitutional treatment of marriage has nothing to do with these 
other treatments of relationship may be to suggest that marriage is some lesser form of 
relationship than parenthood, arguably either because the marital relation is somehow a 
legal construct in the way that other family relationships are not, or because parental 
relationships are simply more important to people than marital ones.  Both of those 
assumptions are misguided.   The law has always defined parental status pursuant to a set 
of criteria that it set, sometimes involving biology sometimes not. See supra notes 89-93 
and text accompanying..   Parenthood, particularly fatherhood, is no more pre-legal than 
is marriage.  Moreover, marriage appears to be just as, if not a more, important as 
parenthood in helping men define themselves in the world.  See NOCK supra note 175 
(passim).  If the relation of parent to child is worthy of constitutional protection because 
of the way in which that relation shapes our identity,  than the relation of spouse to 
spouse may well be also. 
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finds support in the psychological and philosophical theories of adult relationship 
and family. 
V. CONSTITUTIONAL CONFUSION 
 A. Confused Nomenclature  
Part of the reason the connection between marriage and parenthood has not 
been made more clearly may stem from the imprecise and somewhat circular 
language the Court has used to protect family relationships.  Three related and 
overlapping terms are often used: intimacy, privacy and autonomy.  When 
speaking about family relationships, the Supreme Court has used the word 
intimacy frequently,230 though it has never articulated a right to emotional or 
physical intimacy.  Instead, there is (maybe) a right to privacy and there are 
doctrines of family and parental autonomy.   Scholars of the court and of these 
concepts suggest that the terms all have something to do with each other.  
In his famous article on privacy and autonomy,231 published just after Roe v. 
Wade, Louis Henkin argued that when the Supreme Court used the word privacy 
it really meant autonomy, or the right to be free from governmental regulation.232  
In her famous article on privacy, Ruth Gavison argued that there are actually two 
kinds of privacy, the right to self-determination (often thought of as autonomy) 
and the right not to have facts about oneself known.  In his article on intimate 
associations, Kenneth Karst argued that this latter right, the right not to have facts 
disclosed, is also part of our understanding of what constitutes intimacy.233 The 
other understanding of intimacy involves “close and enduring association 
between people”234 or relationship.  Meanwhile, Jennifer Nedelsky argues that 
the term autonomy has no meaning outside the context of relationship.  “When 
we ask ourselves what enables people to be autonomous, the answer is not 
isolation, but relationships.”235  Thus, a right to privacy may be a right to 
autonomy, which has no meaning outside the context of relationship. 
Diagramatically, the etymology looks something like this: 
                                                 
230 Griswold, 381 US at 486 (in context of marriage); SMITH , 431 US at 843 (in context 
of parental-type relationships).  
231 Louis Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REV 1410 (1974). 
232 Id.  
233 “The first meaning of intimacy is synonymous with one of the meaning of privacy:  an 
intimate fact is a private fact, the sort of information about a person that is not normally 
disclosed.”  Karst, supra note 128  at 636.  
234 Id.  
235 Jennifer Nedelsky, Reconceiving Autonomy:  Sources, Thought and Possiblitites, 1 
YALE J. L. AND FEMINISM 7, 12 (1989).  
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Privacy
Right to 
Self-determination
Intimacy
Privacy
Close and Enduring
Relationships
Autonomy
Right to not Have
Facts Disclosed
 
 
 This etymological overlap helps explain some of the doctrinal confusion with 
regard to relationship.  Sometimes that which is protected when we protect 
relational privacy is the right not to have things disclosed,236 but sometimes it is 
the right to self-determination.237  Sometimes, by autonomy, we mean the right to 
be free from governmental regulation,238 but sometimes we mean the right to be 
                                                 
236 The communication privilege is the most obvious example, but so is the kind of 
privacy the court seemed eager to protect in Griswold – the right not to have the 
government snooping around one’s bedroom.  
237  The right not to be a parent protected in Roe can be viewed as a right to self-
determination as can the right of Mr. Redhail to reconstitute himself in the context of 
relationship.  In both contexts, the Court used the word privacy to describe what it was 
protecting.  See Roe, 410 US at 152-153; Zablocki . 434 US at 384.  
238 The court in Prince referenced parental “freedom” to raise their children as they 
wanted, 321 US at 166  and the court in Loving spoke of the “freedom” of choice to 
marry, 388 US at 12.    
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treated as intertwined with others.239 What makes intimate relationships special is 
that they are both private and autonomous.   The people in them exclude the rest 
of the world, but include each other in a way that makes them both independent 
and interdependent.   When the Supreme Court recognizes the importance of 
relationship, it is acknowledging the critical role that relationship can play in our 
lives and it is acknowledging the importance of treating relationships as entities 
unto themselves.   
 B. A  Due Process Requirement? 
Given the primary role that legally recognized family relationships play and 
have always played in people’s lives, there is a strong argument that the 
Constitution must recognize family rights in some way. In his article on the 
constitutional dimensions of tort law, John Goldberg argues that the Constitution 
requires the state to provide “bodies of law that fit certain descriptions, including 
laws of ownership, familial relations and enforceable agreements, as well as law 
for the redress of wrongs.”240  Goldberg rests much of his argument on the 
historical role that the government has played in the redress of private wrongs,241 
but his arguments from history work just as well in family relations as they do in 
tort.  Indeed, the Court has relied heavily on history to explain why it feels 
compelled to protect the family, despite there being no mention of the family in 
the Constitution.  “The fact that no particular provision of the Constitution 
explicitly forbids the State from disrupting the traditional relation of the family – 
a relation as old and as fundamental as our entire civilization – surely does not 
show that the Government was meant to have the power to do so.”242   “Our 
decisions establish that the Constitution protects the sanctity of the family 
because the institution of the family is deeply rooted in the Nation’s history and 
tradition.”243  
Just as government has always provided some redress for private wrongs and 
therefore might be compelled to continue to provide some floor of redress, so the 
government has always recognized some family rights and obligations and 
therefore may be compelled to continue to do so.  Exactly what the floor is, as 
Goldberg suggests, will be a function of a variety of factors, including 
                                                 
239 Meyer, Pierce, Prince and Parham all suggest that part of what parental autonomy 
means is the right to have the state view the parent-child relationship as an entity, instead 
of treating parents and children as separate.   
240 John C.P. Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of Tort Law, 115 YALE L. J. 524 (2005) 
(emphasis added). 
241 Steven Heyman has also argued that history strongly supports a Constitutional 
requirement that the state provide a bare minimum of protection from for private wrongs.  
See Steven J. Heyman, The First Dut7y of Government:  Protetion, Liberty and the 
Fourteenth Amendment, 41 Duke L J 707 (1992).   
242 Griswold, 381 US at  496 (Goldberg concurring).  
243 Moore,  431 US at 1938. 
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contemporary understandings of (in the tort context) wrongs and (in the 
relationship context) family.244   Thus, Goldberg finds no problem in the 
elimination of the torts of seduction or alienation of the affections because 
evolving understandings of women’s rights and women’s agency coupled with 
women’s ability to sue in their own right rendered questionable whether the 
“wrongs” originally meant to be addressed were still considered wrongs.245   
Comparably,  the current tendency to recognize marital and parental rights 
even if not legal status as spouse or parent suggests that contemporary 
understandings of legally relevant relationships have progressed some.  The state 
supreme courts in California, Vermont and New Jersey found themselves 
constitutionally obliged to grant the rights and obligations of marriage even 
though they did not feel compelled to grant marriage to gay men and lesbians.246  
Courts and legislatures often feel compelled to grant parental rights even if not 
the status of parenthood.247    
When someone who has lived with, cared for, shared with and provided for a 
partner for years on end, presents him or herself to a court, arguing that for the 
right to be recognized as a legally relevant person in that partner’s life, the 
“relation between individual and state . . . upon which our institutions rest”248 
may require the state to acknowledge the legitimacy of that relationship.  When 
someone who has lived with, cared for, shared with and provided for a child 
presents him or herself to a court, pleading for the right to be recognized as a 
legally relevant person in that child’s life, a court may be compelled to recognize 
a liberty interest in “the emotional attachments that derive from the intimacy of 
daily association.”249  The floor for state-recognized relationship rights may be 
shifting up.   
Professor Goldberg is careful to point out that his notion of due process does 
not treat “as natural or neutral a set of baselines for constitutional analysis 
arbitrarily drawn from the common law.”250   Instead, he is suggesting that 
scholars should “self-consciously theorize a connection between public and 
                                                 
244 For the list of factors Goldberg would use to determine the floor, see Goldberg, supra 
note 240 at 613.   
245 Id. (The conversion of the husband’s property interest in his wife’s body, or the 
disruption of the marital relation no longer seemed like wrongs).   
246 See discussion of Baker v. Vermont and  Lewis v. Harris supra notes 36-38 and text 
accompanying.   
247 See supra text accompanying notes 13, 37-40.   
248 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 US at 628.  
249 Smith v. OFFER, 431 US at 843.  In Smith, the majority assumed without deciding 
that foster parents developed a protected liberty interest as parents by living with, 
providing for and loving their foster children, even if they never asked for legal status as 
parents.  
250 Goldberg, supra note 240 at 625 
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private law.”251  The tension between the lofty constitutional discourse protecting 
family status, on the one hand, and the statutory or common law incidents of 
legal relationship, on the other, cries out for such a unifying theory in the family 
law context.  As Goldberg notes, “there is a long tradition of holistic thinking in 
Anglo-American constitutional law, one that treats private law not as sub or non-
constitutional, but as part of an overall constitutional order.”252   Understanding 
the constitutional protection of relationship as incorporating many of the state 
laws that treat two as one, in ways that both expand and restrict autonomy, 
follows that tradition of holistic thinking.  
C. Summary 
Though often confused by its own overlapping rhetoric, the Supreme Court 
has consistently recognized that significant autonomy, privacy and intimacy 
values are implicated by the legal treatment of family relationship. The law has 
always facilitated and helped sustain family relationships by treating them as 
distinct and free to flourish (or not) pursuant to their own rules, but governed, if 
at an end, by notions of fusing and sharing.  Given how critical these 
relationships are to peoples’ lives and how strong a role the law has always 
played in protecting them, courts and legislatures seem to sense some affirmative 
obligation to recognize family-like relationships.   The current trend to provide 
the rights of relationship to non-traditional family members, even while resisting 
the expansion of traditional notions of family status, may reflect a sense of this 
affirmative duty.    
VI. CONSEQUENCES  
Regardless of whether one thinks states must provide some minimal 
rubric of relationship rights, and regardless of whether one thinks the current 
tendency to disaggregate relationship rights from family status provides adequate 
redress to those who fail to secure family status, it is not clear that the tendency 
to disaggregate marital and parental rights from their corresponding statuses is a 
good idea for those who care about the legal protection of relationships.  
Disaggregation undermines the social meaning of both marriage and parenthood.  
It also tends to minimize the importance of family obligation and thus makes 
legally recognized relationship less formative.  Finally, disaggregation makes it 
much less likely that courts will continue to honor the doctrine of family 
autonomy. This Part explores these likely consequences of disaggregation.  
 A. Diminution in Meaning  
 As the traditional incidents of marriage and parenthood are increasingly 
disaggregated from the statuses with which they are associated, the social 
meaning of the statuses themselves is diffused.  It is harder to know what both 
                                                 
251 Id.  
252 Id.  
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marriage and parenthood mean in a world in which many who do not have the 
status are treated as if they do.  The Supreme Court of New Jersey recognized 
this irony when it denied same sex couples the right to the status of marriage in 
part because it had granted them the incidents of marriage:  “plaintiffs’ claimed 
right to the name of marriage is surely not the same now that equal rights and 
benefits must be conferred on committed same-sex couples.”253   The Court thus 
explicitly acknowledged that the marital label loses some of its importance if 
people can acquire rights without the label. 
 In addition to the status losing potence when the rights with which it is 
associated can  be dissociated from the label,  the social norms that inform the 
status’ meaning (and are a key part of its stability) may be undermined by the 
existence of alternative legally recognized relationships.  As Elizabeth Scott 
writes “marriage gets its stability in part from the intricate web of  social norms 
regulating spousal behavior.”254  Marriage alternatives may not incorporate those 
social norms and it is not clear that marriage can retain them in the face of 
alternatives.  If states develop many ways of  viewing partners as in relationship 
with each other, there will be less reason for people to “know immediately” what 
the relationship means because it will be harder to internalize which social norms 
apply to which relationships.   
 Perhaps the social norms that we now associate with marriage will continue 
to attach to those who marry even if there are alternative relationships available, 
but alternative statuses will likely have a weaker norm network supporting 
them.255  This will affect not only the people in those alternative statuses, but 
people in marriages as well.  If people who are in domestic partnerships feel less 
bound by norms of stability and fidelity and if a married person knows many 
people in domestic partnerships, the married person’s allegiance to those 
traditional marital norms may seem far less obligatory.256  
 If marriage does come to seem less important, as the New Jersey Supreme 
Court suggests that it will once alternative partnership paradigms are recognized, 
and if marital norms lose more of their strength, as may happen with alternative 
paradigms providing what will likely be weaker norms, then there is every reason 
to believe that the proliferation of alternatives to marriage, even though created 
in the name of preserving marriage, will ultimately undermine the institution.  At 
                                                 
253 Lewis v. Harris ,908 A.2d at 450.  
254 Elizabeth S. Scott,  A World Without Marriage,  41 FAM. L. Q. 537, 562 (2007).  
255 It is likely that any norms accompanying civil unions or domestic partnerships will be 
weaker than norms accompanying marriage simply because those statuses are new and 
people have not had time to internalize the norms associated with them.   
256 It could cut the other way.  Married people might feel more bound by traditional 
marital norms precisely because there were alternatives available and they chose 
marriage.  I am not contending that the availability of alternatives will necessarily erode 
the social norms associated with marriage. I am only contending that it may.   
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a minimum, it will make claims to marital status seem more frivolous because it 
will be less clear that those who are deprived of marriage are deprived of 
anything significant.  
 Creating alternative legal forms of parent-like relationships will likely have a 
comparable effect. It is already clear that creating alternative forms of parenthood 
dilutes the parental rights of those who are otherwise parents.  Here, it is 
important to underscore a key difference between marriage and parenthood.  
Expanding the kinds of marital-like relationships available does not alter the 
legal rights and obligations associated with marriage. 257  The rights and 
obligations of different unions may vary depending on whether they are 
marriages or civil unions or domestic partnerships and, as just discussed, the 
social meaning and social norms associated with those unions may vary, but if A 
is married to B and C is domestic partnered with D, A’s legal rights and 
obligations vis a vis B will not be affected by C’s legal rights and obligations vis 
a vis D.258  Parenthood is more complicated legally.  If A and B are parents of C, 
and D is a de facto Parent of C, then D’s semi-parental status undermines the 
legal rights and obligations of A and B.   The more of a privilege that D has to 
exercise visitation or custodial rights, the less exclusive are A and B’s rights as 
parents.   
 If, as may well be the case,259 we are moving toward a world in which it is far 
more common for more than one or two people to have relationship claims to a 
child, then it is likely that the social meaning of parenthood will diminish in 
importance.  If, for instance, it is relatively common for a child to have a de 
Facto parent in addition to one or two “regular” parents, then it is unlikely that 
claims for parental status per se will have much resonance.  Why should someone 
like Michael H. be awarded the status of father if it is commonplace for people 
like him to get visitation rights without having parental status?  Misters Quilloin 
and Lehr260 would not need to block the adoption of their biological child by 
another man; they could just assume 3rd party rights. Or the mother’s new 
husband could.  In other words, just as the proliferation of many legal forms of 
partnerships may make claims to marriage itself seem frivolous, so the 
proliferation of many forms of quasi-parenthood may make claims to parental 
status per se seem frivolous. 
                                                 
257 This assumes a world without polgyny and polyamory.  A world with multiple 
marriage partners would present the same problems as the kinds of issues we currently 
have with multiple parenthood.  For a thoughtful discussion suggesting that maybe we 
should not automatically take polyamory off the table,  see Elizabeth Emens, 
Monogamy’s Law:  Compulsory Monogamy and Polyamorous Existence, 29 NYU REV. L 
& SOC. CHANGE 277 (2004).  
258 As just suggested, the social norms associated with A’s partnership with  B may affect 
the social norms associated with C’s marriage to D.  
259 See Bartlett, supra note 40; Baker, Bionormativity, supra note 37 .  
260 See supra text accompanying notes 96-98.    
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 B. Diminution in Burden, Diminution in Benefit 
As detailed above, the often harsh and restrictive obligations that the law 
imposes on marital partners and parents makes sense in light of the ways in 
which people are enriched and ennobled when the law treats two as one.  In 
crafting the legal rules that require sharing and assume fusing, the law helps 
people transcend self through relationship.  It is because the desire to transcend 
self in this way is so primary and constitutive that the government may have  an 
obligation to recognize family rights and obligations. 
When separating the incidents of status from the statuses themselves, 
however, courts and legislatures have demonstrated a clear preference for 
bestowing the benefits of relationship, while not necessarily imposing relational 
obligations.  In the domestic partnership area, employers and legislators are much 
more likely to allow partners access to third party benefits (health and disability 
insurance) than to require domestic partners to share property or assume long-
term financial responsibility for each other.261  In the parental area, courts and 
legislators are clearly more comfortable awarding visitation than imposing child 
support obligations.262   
Creating these “marriage-lite”263  and “parenthood-lite” arrangements ignores 
the important psychological and constitutive benefits that come from obligation.   
The legal rules that make family members responsible for one another help 
define our social understanding of family obligation.  That social understanding 
in turn informs our conceptualization of family and, most likely, our personal 
interpretations of connection and obligation.  How fused does one feel with 
someone else if there is no mutual long term obligation to support?   How much 
can a parental relationship change who one is if one is not legally required to do 
anything for or with the child?   
To some, state-imposed family obligations may seem superfluous because 
the duty to care derives from emotional, not legal obligations.  Yet millions of 
ex-spouses try to minimize post-divorce support, just as millions of parents try to 
                                                 
261 See Blumberg, supra note 14 at  1290-1292  (noting how by failing to treat domestic 
partnership pension rights the way it treats marital pension rights, the UCLA domestic 
partnership program gives domestic partner’s less of a claim on each other’s financial 
assets).  See also RAUCH,  supra note 205 at 43-46 (referring to domestic partnership as 
“marriage-lite” and suggesting that such arrangments often don’t include all of the 
obligations of marriage.)  
262  Compare, e.g., ENO v. LMM, 711 NE 2d 886 (Mass. 1999)  (awarding visitation 
rights to a non-biological lesbian co-partner in part because of pre-existing agreement to 
share parenting) with TF v. BL, Mass. No 09104 (Aug. 25, 2004) (ruling that a pre-
existing agreement in which the non-biologically related lesbian partner agreed to 
provide support for the child was not binding).  See generally, Baker, supra note 50 at 
121 .   
263 See RAUCH, supra note 188 at 31.  
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dodge child-support obligations.  Would marriage and parenthood carry with 
them the same personal or social meaning if their legal meaning changed such 
that the law lets people walk away from the family obligations they had once 
accepted?  Without the traditional obligations of spouse and parent, the roles of 
partner and caretaker become much less formative and meaningful and therefore 
less worthy of constitutional protection.   Over time, if more people in legally 
recognized relationships fail to live up to the traditional obligations associated 
with those relationships (because the law does not make them) then the need to 
honor any non-traditional relationship may decline because those relationships 
will be seen as more voluntary and less constitutive.  
C. Diminution in Privacy 
Finally, the less uniform the social meaning of marriage and parenthood, the 
less likely that the law will protect the negative rights and the ideology of privacy 
associated with family statuses.  The Supreme Court of California emphasized 
the importance of family privacy in In Re Marriage Cases.  “One very important 
aspect of the substantive protection afforded by the  . . . constitutional right to 
marry is, of course, an individual’s right to be free from undue government 
intrusion (or interference with) . . . the right to marital and familial privacy.”264  
Yet the more legally varied and individualized family-like relationships become, 
the less likely courts will be to respect family privacy because courts will need to 
insert themselves inside those families, in order to ascertain the individual rights 
and responsibilities involved. 
For instance, domestic partners who have access to each other’s health 
insurance and rights to hospital visitation, but who do not live in states that treat 
domestic partners as married for financial purposes, will be left to rely on notions 
of constructive trust, quasi-contract or contract for adjudication of questions 
pertaining to property distribution and future financial support. Not only do these 
theories often fail to render just or consistent results,265 they involve searching 
inquiries into what actually happened during the course of the relationship.  In 
order to prove a constructive trust that can secure for one an interest in an ex-
partner’s property, plaintiffs must demonstrate the extent of their  individual 
contributions to the relationship.266 
                                                 
264  In Re Marriage Cases,  76 Cal Rptr 3d 683, 733.  The Court went on to say “the 
constitutional right to marry . . . obligate[s] the state to . . . protect the core elements of 
the family relationship from at least some types of improper interference by others.”  Id.  
265 See generally, Ira Mark Ellman, “Contract Thinking” was Marvin’s Fatal Flaw, 76 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1365 (2001)  (discussing the failure of contract doctrine to 
incorporate the variety of factors that should go into a spousal compensation award).  
266 See, for instance, Evans v. Wall, 542 So.2d 1055 (Fla. Dist Ct. App. 3d Dist 1989)  
(evidence of plaintiff’s contributions of food, telephone service, furnishings, cooking, 
washing and cleaning services used to establish a constructive trust that would allow her 
to receive a share of her ex-partner’s property);  Sullivan v. Rooney, 404 Mass. 160, 533 
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Comparably, plaintiffs using claims of implicit contract must parade the 
details of their relationship before the court in order to establish the agreement 
pursuant to which they expect to collect.267  Even with this evidence, courts often 
resist finding implicit contracts. As the New York Court of Appeals wrote in 
Marone v. Marone:  
As a matter of human experience personal services will frequently be 
rendered by two people living together because they value each other’s 
company or because they find it a convenient or rewarding thing to do.  
For courts to attempt through hindsight to sort out the intentions of the 
parties and affix jural significance to conduct carried out within an 
essentially private and generally noncontractual relationship runs too 
great a risk of error.268 
Marone thus required that plaintiffs show an express contract before they can 
collect on any promise for future support.   
 Express contract theories prove to be just as intrusive, however, because 
prohibitions on contracts for sexual services mean that courts take the 
consideration inquiry very seriously.  Thus, in two different cases involving 
express contract, California courts found consideration when an ex-partner 
served as chauffeur, bodyguard and social and business secretary,269 but not when 
another ex-partner served only as social companion and hostess.270  New York 
courts have found that foregoing a career opportunity for the sake of a 
                                                                                                                         
NE2d 1372 (1989) (evidence plaintiff gave up job as flight attendant and maintained 
home for defendant helped establish a constructive trust on the home purchased  by her 
ex-partner); Minors v. Tyler, 137 Misc. 505 (City Civ. Ct. 1987) (constructive trust is the 
appropriate doctrine under which to evaluate male cohabitant’s claim to his ex-partner’s 
property); Small v. Harper, 638 SW2d 24 (Tex. App. Houston 1st Dist. 1982) (id. [with 
gender’s reversed]).  
267 See Watts v. Watts, 448 NW2d 292 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989) (court evaluating extensive 
evidence of parties’ behavior and finances;  Glasco v. Glasco, 410 NE2d 1325, 1331-32 
(Ind. Ct. App. 1980)  (“[r]ecovery for parties seeking relief [sh]ould be based only upon 
legally  viable contractual and/or equitable grounds which the parties could establish 
according to their own particular circumstance.” (emphasis added).  See also Bright v. 
Kuehl, 650 NE2d 311. 315 (Ind. Ct. App 1995) (following Glasco).   
268 Marone v. Marone, 413 NE2d 1154, 1157 (NY 1980).  
269 Wharton v. Dillingham, 202 Cal. App3d 447 (4th Dist. 1988).  
270 Bergen v. Wood, 14 Cal. App. 4th 854 (2d Dist. 1993)  (Curiously, the court refused to 
find consideration here because the parties’ never cohabited. Thus, apparently, 
cohabitation is an essential part of the consideration necessary for a support promise, 
even though sexual services alone are an impermissible basis for consideration.)  
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relationship is adequate consideration,271 but they will not presume that an 
unemployed ex-partner forewent career opportunities.272    
 It is precisely these kinds of detailed particularities of different relationships 
that courts have traditionally eschewed in the name of allowing family 
relationships to construct themselves on their own.  The parties to a marriage get 
to determine what is fair and reciprocal and courts except it as such to the extent 
that they are bound to divide the property in half, regardless of the roles taken in 
producing it.  As discussed, legal obligations and liabilities have attached 
because of the fact of family status and regardless of the particular details of 
individual family arrangements. The more courts get into the details of 
relationships without that status, the less allegiance they may feel to the ideology 
of family autonomy in general.  
 Comparably, a child who has legally cognizable relationships with numerous 
adults is a child who is much more likely to have his schooling decisions, 
religious upbringing and extracurricular activities determined by a court than by 
one or two parents.   As of now, adults with parental status have an almost 
irrebutable right to visitation and guaranteed standing to assert a claim for 
custody. 273  If parents are married, their decisions regarding their children are 
presumed to be in their children’s best interest.  The quality and content of their 
relationships with their children is never at issue. 
 But if a third party has potential rights, the behavior of both the adults with 
parental status and those without it comes under scrutiny.  In order to determine 
whether a third party non-parent has standing to make a visitation or custody 
claim, courts insist on analyzing “the nature of [the] parent and child 
relationship.”274  “[W]hile it is presumed that a child’s best interest is served by 
maintaining the family’s privacy and autonomy, that presumption must give way 
where the child has established strong psychological bonds with a [a non-legal 
parent.].”275   
                                                 
271 McCullon v. McCullon, 96 Misc 2d 962 (Sup. 1978).  
272 Cohn v. Levy, 725 NYS2d 376 (2d Dpt. 2001) (The Court emphasized that the 
plaintiff had not held a job in some time [she had been previously married], but the court 
did not explain how it thought she would have provided for herself if she had not been in 
the relationship.  Presumably, she had to have foregone whatever other means of support 
would have kept her provided for, but the court did not acknowledge this.)  
273 “Denial of visitation is an extreme remedy, rarely approved.”  HARRIS, TEITELBAUM 
AND Carbone, supra note at 103 
274 Mason v. Dwinnell, 600 SE2d 58, 65.  
275 JAL v. EPH, 682 A.2d 1314, 1319-20,  (1996), quoted in TB v. LRM, 768 Ad 913, 
917 (2001).  
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 It is already clear that in cases of divorce, courts evaluate religious 
practices,276choice of community decisions,277 and financial entitlements.278  For 
married parents, the ability of parents to make these difficult, value-laden child 
rearing decisions is what makes parenthood “central to our conception of human 
flourishing.”279  Yet the more people there are with rights to rear one particular 
child, the less able any of them are  to “inculcate and pass down [their] most 
cherished values.”280  The more adults with relationship rights to a child, the 
more potential legal disputes there are and the more likely it is that a court, not a 
parent, will be determining what is in the child’s best interest.  The constitutive 
benefits of parenthood, and the privacy of all parents involved, will be seriously 
compromised.  
VII. CONCLUSION 
There is an extensive academic critique of the family suggesting that perhaps 
the law should just get out of the family relationship business altogether.281  
Despite this critique, many, many people continue to ask the law to recognize 
their family relationships. Marriage and parenthood, partnership and caretaking 
may look very different today than they did fifty years ago, but for the most part, 
people are not rejecting  any role for the law in shaping and defining family 
                                                 
276 In re Hadeen, 619 P.2d 372 9Wash 1980); Mentry v, Mentry, 190 Cal. Roptr. 843, 850 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1983).  
277 Ramirez-Barker v. Barker, 418 SE2d 675, 680 (NC Ct. App 1992 (holding that 
primary custodian could not move in order to be closer to relatives); In re Marriage of 
Sheley, 895 P2d 850, 856 (Wash. Ct. App 1995)  (custodial mother could not move out of 
Seattle area).  
278 If family income is over a certain amount, courts determine the “realistic needs of the 
children,”  Peterson v. Peterson, 434 NW2d 732, 738 (S.D. 1989);  See also, In re 
Marriage of bush, 547 NE2d 590, 596 (Ill. 1989).  
279 See Gilles, supra note 193 at  962.  
280 See Moore, supra, 431 US at 503-04.  
281 More commentators seem eager to dispense with marriage than parenthood, see, for 
instance, Martha A. Fineman, The Meaning of Marriage in MARRIAGE PROPOSALS: 
QUESTIONING A LEGAL STATUS (A. Bernstein, ed. 2006) (advocating eliminating 
marriage, but strengthening parenthood);  Sunstein, supra note 8 at 2104 (questioning the 
benefits of marriage while assuming that the law’s treatment of parenthood is 
appropriate).  Polikoff, supra note 179 (arguing that marriage is irredeemably gendered).  
Few people argue for dispensing with the idea of parenthood, but several argue for 
opening the category up significantly.  See Bartlett, supra note 40 (arguing that adults 
who have played significant roles in children’s lives should be given legal rights); 
Woodhouse, supra note 40 (arguing to provide parental rights to adults who have 
supported a mother during pregnancy).  I have suggested that perhaps we should restrict 
our notion of parenthood, at least in infancy, so as to minimize the role of biology.  See  
Baker, supra note 38 at 45-48.  
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relationships, they are asking the law to draw family shapes and make family 
definitions that include them.  
To the extent that litigants have made constitutional claims to be included in 
traditional definitions of family, they have not been that successful.  
Constitutions do not afford particularly robust protection to family status.  
Claimants have been much more successful in securing relationship rights, 
however.  Sometimes these rights are granted,  under state constitutions, in lieu 
of conferring traditional status; sometimes these rights are granted legislatively; 
sometimes courts simply create doctrines that recognize relationship rights and 
obligations between non-traditional family members. 
The prevalence of this legal recognition of non-traditional relationships 
suggests that legal actors appreciate the state’s affirmative duty to recognize 
relationship rights.  Courts and legislatures feel compelled to honor certain 
relationships legally even if they don’t feel compelled to afford those 
relationships family status.   When looked at as a whole, the Supreme Court 
doctrine on relationships suggests that there is some constitutional requirement 
that the law respect family relationships for reasons other than just their 
expressive potential, for reasons that have to do with the formative role that 
family relationships play in many people’s lives. 
 If one believes that the law’s role in fostering and promoting these 
relationships is beneficial and important, though, this article suggests that courts 
and legislatures should be wary of disaggregating relationship rights from 
relationship status in the way that they have.  While jealously guarding what it 
means to be married and what it means to parent, courts and legislatures have 
created an alternative regime of relationship rights that ultimately may undermine 
some of the most important ways that the law honors relationship.  Cafeteria-
style family rights require a degree of judicial construction, monitoring and 
evaluation that is antithetical to the privacy, intimacy and autonomy values that 
motivate the law to respect relationship in the first place.   
 Concretely, what this means is that if one believes in the legitimacy and 
importance of  legal marriage, then one should be wary of supporting “marriage-
lite” arrangements because the very existence of alternative structures will foster 
a legal culture that is used to inserting itself inside relationships to define and 
evaluate them instead of leaving them alone.  Comparably, if one believes in the 
importance of parental autonomy and privacy, one needs to be wary of 
alternative parenting constructs that give courts not only the discretion, but often 
the duty, to make traditional parenting decisions.   
 Conservative and (some) liberals can even agree on the analysis to this point.  
They can agree that the disaggregation of rights from status is dangerous.  Where 
they will part ways is in what to do about it.  To conservatives, the response to 
the danger will be to try to reign in the liberal social norms and values that have 
allowed alternative family forms to flourish. If alternative family forms cease to 
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exist in such numbers, the pressure on the law to recognize them will obviously 
dissipate.   
 To liberals who believe that many non-traditional relationships should be 
recognized by law, the response to the danger will be to try to fight all the harder 
for family status.  If non-traditional family members are entitled to marital and 
parental rights then they should be entitled to marital and parental status. 
Affording them something lesser not only leaves alternative family members 
with something lesser, it undermines the institutions of marriage and parenthood 
for everyone.   
  
 
